make him punishable with death, in as much as 1820. both vessel and crew no longer retained any pretention to national character after assuming that of a pirate. 7. That the national character of a vessel is a fact which a jury may find upon such evidence as will satisfy their minds, without production of the register, or proof of its having been on board of her. 8. That the 8th question is answered in the answer given to the fourth question. The UNITED STATES v. DAVID BOWERS and CERTIFICATE. -This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Georgia, and on the questions on which the Judges of that Court were divided in opinion, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, 1. That the act of the 30th of April, 1790, entitled, &c. section 8th, does extend to piracy committed by the crew of a foreign vessel on a vessel exclusively owned by persons not citizens of the United States, in the case of these prisoners, in which it appears that the crew assumed the character of pirates, whereby they lost all claim to national character or protection. 2. That the 8th section of the act of the 30th of April, 1790, entitled, &c. has not been repealed by the 8th section of the act of March 3, 1819, entitled, &c. U. States v. Pirates. 1820. U. States v. Pirates. The UNITED STATES V. DAVID BOWERS and CERTIFICATE. ---This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Georgia, and on the questions on which the Judges of that Court were divided in opinion, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, 1. That it is competent to prove the national character of an American vessel without evidence of her register. 2. That it is competent for the jury to find that the piracy was committed on the high seas, upon evidence that the Asia, at the time she was boarded, was at anchor in an open roadstead at the island of Bonavista. 3. That the 8th section of the act of the 30th of April, 1790, entitled, &c. is not repealed by the 8th section of the act of March 3, 1819, entitled, &c. 4. That each count in an indictment is a substantive charge, and if the finding conform to any one of them which in itself will support the verdict, it is sufficient to give judgment. (CHANCERY AND LOCAL LAW) STEVENSON's Heirs v. SULLIVANT. Previous to the year 1775, H. S. of Virginia, cohabited with A. W., and had by her the appellants, whom he recognized as his children. In July, 1775, he made his will, which was duly proved after his decease, in which he described them as the children of himself, and of his wife A., and devised the whole of his property to them and their mother. In June, 1776, he was appointed a colonel in the Virginia line, upon the continental establishment, and died in the service, having in July, 1776, intermarried with the mother, and died leaving her pregnant with a child, who was afterwards born, and named R. S. After the death of H. S., and the birth of his posthumous son, a warrant for a tract of military lands was granted by the State of Virginia to the posthumous son, R. S., who died in 1796, in his minority, without wife or children, and without having located or disposed of the warrant. His mother also died before 1796. Held, that the children of H. S. were not entitled to the lands, as devisees under his will, under the act of Assembly; nor did the will so far operate, as to render them capable of taking under the act, as being named his legal representatives in the will. The appellants were not legitimated by the marriage of H. S. with their mother, and his recognition of them as his children, under the 19th section of the act of descents of Virginia, of 1785, which took effect on the 1st of January, 1787. The appellants were not, as illegitimate children of H. S. and A. W., capable of inheriting from R. S. under the act of descents of Virginia, APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Ohio. This was a suit in Chancery, and the case upon the facts admitted by the parties, was as follows: Previous to the year 1775, Hugh Stephenson, of Virginia, lived and cohabited with Ann Whaley, and had by her the appellants in this cause, whom he recognized 1820. Stevenson's Sullivant, 5wh207 59f 244 Stevenson's 1820. as his children. In July, 1775, he made his will, in which he described the appellants as the children Heirs of himself, and of his wife Ann, and devised the Sullivant. whole of his property to them, and to their mother. v. Feb. 18th. In July, 1776, he intermarried with the said Ann Whaley, and died the succeeding month, leaving her pregnant with a child, which was afterwards born, and was named Richard. The will was duly proved after the death of the testator. In June, 1776, the testator was appointed a colonel in the Virginia line, upon continental establishment, and died in the service. After his death, and the birth of Richard, a warrant for 6,666 and two-thirds acres of military lands, was granted by the State of Virginia to the said Richard, who died in the year 1796, in his minority, without wife or children, and without having located or disposed of the above warrant. His mother also died before the year 1796. The defendant claimed the land in controversy under John Stephenson, the elder paternal uncle of Richard; and the appellants having filed their bill in the Court below to recover the premises in question, the same was dismissed, and the cause was brought by appeal to this Court. Mr. Brush, for the appellants, stated, that the appellants insisted, that, as representatives of their father, Hugh, the warrant in question ought to have issued to them. All the laws of Virginia, granting military land bounties, were passed after the death of Hugh Stephenson. The act which extends the bounty to those who had died before any bounty was v. provided, is that under which the warrant issued. It 1820. assigns the bounty to the "legal representatives" of Stevenson's the person upon account of whose services it was Heirs granted. We maintain, that the term, representa- Sullivant. tives, is used purposely not to exclude the heir, but to embrace others than the legal heir, under the then existing laws. It never could be intended to give a bounty to elder brothers and uncles, who might be in arms against the country; but to the immediate objects of the soldier's attention and care, whom, by his will, he had appointed to represent him, or to that class of relatives, among whom personal property was distributed by the statute of distributions; certainly more just and liberal in its provisions, than the feudal course of descents, by which real estate was cast on the eldest male relative in a collateral line. But, waving this point, the complainants maintain that they are heirs at law of Richard Stephenson. And they maintain this upon two grounds. First. By the Virginia law, regulating the course of descents, passed in 1785, they were legitimated. Second. By the same law, as bastards, they were made capable of inheriting to their deceased brother, on the part of the mother. 1. The ancestor of Richard never had any interest in the subject that constitutes the estate. It is a gratuity given to his representative, who most clearly took as a purchaser, and the estate he held, upon his decease, passed to his heirs generally, without reference to the channel through which he derived it. The estate originated under the laws of Virginia. The parties resided in Virginia, until the establishment of |