The jacobinical party that had fo long domineered in the public-councils, confident as above related, from victory over the sections of Paris, and treading in the very footsteps of Robespierre, had appointed a commiffion of five, for the fafety of the country; and but for the bold and animated efforts of a few men would certainly have effected the flavery of France in the permanency of the convention. The directors, con integrity and upright intentions of the representatives and rulers being conftantly supported by a general fimplicity of manners, and a facred regard to the principles of morality and religion. In the newly conftituted government of France both these kinds of steadiness were wanting. It was less democratical indeed than that of 1793; but still the executive power was configned into five hands instead of one only. It was not stayed as all other republics fcious of the general odium they, in of any extent and durability have common with the other leaders of hitherto been, by some individual, the convention, had incurred on power, whether under the name of this attempt, and alfo of their malarchon, duke, doge, king, stadt- versation in precipitating the conholder, or the president of a congress. It was impoffible that five directors, and these Frenchmen too, should, for any length of time, act with harmony. They split into parties hostile and violent, in proportion to the power with which they were invested: in order to retain which the preponderating party treated their rivals in the directory, and their opponents in the councils with the most merciless severity, and repeatedly violated the conftitution, under the pretence of preferving it. Like their predecessors in the revolution, in default of fimplicity of manners, and the other requisites to a genuine republic, they had recourte to intrigue and violence. Had their own manners been more pure than they were, without those adventitious supports in so great and corrupt a commonwealth, and where all are so prone to direct, but none to be directed, they could not, for even a short time, have held together any semblance of a regular fabric of government. There was one point, however, n which the directory on their elevation to power unanimously agreed. 1 fideration of the new constitution. and garbling the reports that had been made concerning its acceptance, determined to divert the minds of the nation from their own conduct, and to exhaust the public discontents by a prosecution of the war. If this should prove fuccessful, of which they entertained not any doubt, the merit would, in a very great degree, be reflected on themfelves, and the enemies of the directory would be regarded, by the nation at large, as enemies to the victories and glory of France. They were undoubtedly fortunate in the choice of their commanders. The fuccesses of their generals occupied and dazzled the public mind for a time; but wifdom, conftancy, and purity of design, without which no profperity can be lasting, were wanting in the fupreme councils. The armies were neglected; the tide of fuccess was turned; and finally, to shew how little that temporary fuccess was owing to any principles inherent in the constitution, the vast and stupendous genius of one man, to which chiefly the directory were indebted for a temporary The close of the year 1795 was not fo favourable to the French as that of the preceding; they had projected at its commencement to follow up their fuccesses in Holland, by carrying their victorious arms into the heart of Germany; but a variety of obftructions had either prevented or frustrated their designs. At home the violence of the many factions, open or concealed, stood perpetually in the way of government, and impaired its proposed energies. Abroad the remaining parts of the coalition against France, though foiled in their repeated attempts, still poserved their spirit, and determination to perfift at all hazards in carrying on the war. The principal scene of action had been on the banks of the Rhine. Here it had been generally expected, that after the fubjugation of the seven United Provinces, the French would have met with no confiderable oppofition; but though difpirited, as well as weakened, by the fevering of fo material a limb from the great body of the confederacy, it still found sufficient refources to make head against the French, in a country where the generality of the inhabitants, though diffatisfied at their rulers, were not fo imprudent as to prefer a foreign to a domeftic yoke, and would not fail to co-operate in oppofing a French invafion. To this difpofition of an incomparable majority of the inhabitants of Germany was, in a great meafure, due the little progress of the French in those provinces of the empire on the right fide of the Rhine, into which they had, with much difficulty, found means to penetrate, and from which they had been, after much fruitless toil and unfuccefsful efforts, compelled to retire with very confiderable loffes. The failure of the French in their expedition into Germany; their expulfion from every post they had occupied on the eastern banks of the Rhine; their retreat across that river; the pursuit of their difcomfited army into the borders of France; and the several defeats they experienced, were circumstances so little hoped for at the commencement of this year's military operations in those parts that they proportionably revived the spirit of their enemies, and infused a degree of confidence into them, to which they had been strangers, fince the disasters of the preceding campaign. But, notwithstanding their ill fuccess on the Rhine, the French maintained a decided fuperiority in every other quarter. Europe seemed to stand at bay, and to wait with anxiety the termination of a quarrel that had produced fo many ftupendous events. The diffolution of the confederacy, by the feceffion of Pruffia and Spain, was far from being confidered as complete: the principal members, Great Britain and Austria were held fully competent, though not to the purpose of fubduing, yet still to that of repreffing the French; and this was now viewed as the only object, at which they ought, in prudence, in the present situation of their affairs, to aim. During the course of the campaign, the government in France had entertained fome ideas tending to a general pacification; but the [B2] loftiloftiness of their pretenfions, dictated by the pride of their nation, was so apparent, that Europe was not furprised that they were only mentioned tranfiently in their occafional difcourses on that fubject. The inveteracy of the ruling party to England subsisted almost as violently as ever. The French beheld, with that rancour which attends an unfuccefsful rivalship, the improbability of their ever attaining to an equality with the English at fea. It greatly mortified their pride, that all the European nations should unaimoufly afcribe a decided superiority in naval tactics to the English, and reprefent those as no less invincible on the ocean, than the French had hitherto been at land; with this difference, however, to the difadvantage of the latter, that it would prove a much eafier task to overcome them at land than the others at fea. Other causes of dissatisfaction militated against the ruling party in France. The royalists, however depressed, were not difpirited: their numbers, though inferior to those of the republicans, were immenfe; they maintained a close correfpondence with each other, and cemented theit reciprocal connections with all those acts of friendship and kindness that bind men so strongly together, when fuffering from the fame caufes, and acting from the fame motives. The vigilance of the republican government found conftant employment in obviating the dangers that threatened it from the indefatigable activity of those irreconcilable antagonists, who, though furrounded with continual observers of all their motions, neglected no opportunity to further their designs, and boldly encountered every risk of being detected in their profecution. Enraged at these domeftic enemies, the predominant party was perpetually occupied in holding out every species of menace and terror to reprefs and discourage them; but neither threats nor invitations availed. Actuated by hatred and resentment the royalists confidered themselves as equally justified, by confcience and interest, in their determination to seize every occafion of refifting the established powers, holding them as ufurpers, with whom no measures ought to be kept, and whom they were bound to oppofe, whenever there appeared the leaft likelihood of doing it to any effect. Such was the fituation of France at this period, deeply convulfed at home, and though in poffeffion of many extenfive countries, yet, fearful that having acquired, and retaining them only by the right of the sword, they might lose them through the fame means: an event, which, confidering the viciffitudes of war, was not more improbable than the aftonishing fuccefles that had attended their arms against all likelihood and expectation. While the people in France were distracted with these internal divifions, those of England were agitated little less with inceflant differences and disputes on the propriety of continuing a war, which had occafioned fuch loffes of men and expence of treasure, without producing those effects which had fo repeatedly been represented as infallible. Nothing had been omitted to procure fuccofs: every minifterial demand had been granted, every meafure acceeded to; but the object proposed remained unaccomplished, and as far out of the reach of all reasonable expectation, as at the first moment of its being attempted All parties seemed, at this period, to unite in the like ftrain of reasoning. Numbers of those who had warmly efpoused the caufe of the minister, thought that a fufficient trial had been made of the various schemes he had brought forward, in order to compel the French to revert to their former fituation; and that, having failed, prudence enjoined him to defift, and to leave the re-eftablishment of the French monarchy to a future period, and more aufpicious opportunities. remained That party, which had oppofed the war from its very commencement, were loud in their reprobation of its continuance, and reproached minifters with a total want of forefight, in not feeming to have apprehended the difficulties they would have to contend with, and, with equal inability, to encounter them. As the events of the war countenanced these reproaches, the public joined in them, and the government was thought very reprehenfible in perfifting againft reiterated experience, in a conteft that threatened to waste the strength of the nation ineffectually, and the aim of which, were it attained, would not prove an indemnification for its coft. Ideas of this nature were now generally predominant, and became, at last, fo prevalent, not only among the multitude, which had long been fwayed by them, but among the more reputable classes, that a variety of affociations were formed, and meetings held, for the avowed purpose of petitioning the legislature in favour of peace. The city of Lon don led the way, and, in a commonhall, the votes, for a petition, were four thousand, and only one hundred against it. The terms in which it was con ceived were extremely pointed. "None of the ends propofed by the war, (to use the words of the petition) had either been, or appeared likely to be, obtained, although it had been carried on at an unprecedented expence to this country, and had already produced an alarming increase of the national debt, augmented by fubfidies, paid to allies, who had notorioufly violated their folemn engagements, and rendered no adequate fervice for large fums actually received by them, and wrung from the credulity of the generous and induftrious inhabitants of this island." It concluded by expreffing a firm and decided conviction, that the principle on which the war appeared to be carried on, neither was, nor could be, essential to the liberty, the glory, or the profperity, of the British empire. Other addresses, in a fimilar style, were refolved on in feveral of the principal cities in the kingdom. The adherents to miniftry endeavoured, on the other hand, to procure counter petitions: but these were faint and languid in comparifon to the former; those who framed them, did not venture to speak in justification of the war; they went no farther than to leave to minifters the choice of their own time for pacific negociations. A circumftance that had greatly indisposed the mercantile and trading clatles against ministry, was, the refusal to permit the Dutch people of property, to depofit their money and effects in England, without pay[B3] ing ing the customary duties. Had this permiffion been granted, upwards of twenty millions of fpecie, and other treasure, would, it was faid, have been brought into this country.. The reason alleged, for denying the request of the Dutch mer chants, was, that if they were al lowed to transport their effects into England, it would operate as a difcouragement to their countrymen, and prevent them from acting with vigour against the French, who, having fubdued the Austrian Netherlands, were then preparing to carry their victorious arms into the United Provinces: but the reply to this allegation was, that the French party was so powerful in Holland, that it was easy to forefee that all refiftance would be vain. It would have been good policy, therefore, to have encouraged the moniedmen, in that country, to have lodged their property in England; as most of them were manifestly inclined to do, in order to preserve it from the rapacity of the French, whose wants were fuch as would infallibly induce them to fupercede all confiderations, in order to provide for them foon as they should find themselves in poffeffion of a country, the wealth of which was competent to fupply them with what they needed. as This refufal, on the part of the British adminiftration, was generally deemed a very unseasonable overfight. It threw into the hands of the French an immenfe quantity of money and wealth of every denomination, which might evidently have centered in England, together with its owners. This would, in a very confiderable measure, have compenfated for the lofs of Holland to the confederacy, and amply indemnified Great Britain, by the prodigi ous acceffion of real property that muft have been the neceffary confequence of the emigrations of rich individuals from the United Provinces. Another overfight, no less real, though lefs noticed, was an article in a treaty which had been agreed on with the American States, by which their trade to the British islands in the West Indies was reftricted to vessels of an inferior fize. This, instead of diminifuing their commerce thither, tended rather to encrease it, by adding to their number of feamen: whether in large, or in small vefsfels, this commerce was so profitable to them, that whatever obstacles were thrown in their way, would quickly be overcome by their industry and activity: the profits of trade would be more divided, but the number of hands employed in it would produce the double confequence, both of gradu, ally extending it, and of augmenting the number of American seamen. These various confiderations contributed materially to difplease the generality of people. The burthens of the war were fo heavy, and fuch multitudes felt their weight, that discontents and murmurs abounded every where. The different motives afsigned, at different epoclis of the war, for its continuance, were also highly prejudicial to minifters, as they led many to think that the real motive was purposedly kept out of fight, and was of too invidious a nature to be frankly acknowledged. Ideas of this nature were now universally current among the difapprovers of the war, and were afferted and circulated by them with confiderable effect. But that circumstance which was the most unfortunate |