trees, to break up bridges, and to hang upon the fanks of the British army. JUNE 17.] When it was fully ascertained that Sir Henry Clinton was crossing the Delaware, General Washington required the opinion of his officers respecting measures proper to be pursued. General Lee, who, having been exchanged, had now joined the army, was decidedly against a general action, and he discountenanced a partial attack, on the supposition that it would probably bring on a general engagement. In this opinion, the officers almost unanimously concurred. Of seventeen generals, who composed the military council, on this occasion, General Wayne and General Cadwallader only were decidedly in favour of an engagement. General Green gave it as his opinion that the country should be defended, and that if this led to an engagement, he would not shun it. Although many of their stores were taken down the river in the shipping, yet the British army was encumbered with an immense quantity of baggage; and their line of march extended twelve miles. The weather being intensely hot, their movements were very slow; in seven days, they marched only forty miles. On the 24th, General Clinton reached Allenton, and it was yet uncertain whether he would take the road to Amboy, or to Sandy Hook. General Washington therefore kept upon the high lands of New Jersey, above the enemy. In this situation, he had it in his power to fight or not, as circumstances should dictate. By the slow movement of the enemy, he was inclined to think that Sir Henry wished for an engagement. Colonel Morgan, with his regiment consisting of six hundred men, was detached to gain the right flank of the enemy, and ordered to annoy him in every possible way. General Cadwallader, with Jackson's regiment, and a small corps of militia, was ordered to harass his rear. The British army by this time was calculated at ten thousand men, and the American army consisted of between ten and eleven thousand. Although the late council decided, by a large majority against a general engagement, yet General Washington inclined to the measure. He again summoned his officers, and took their opinion, "whether it was advisable to seek a general action? If advisable, is it best to attack with the whole army, to bring on a general engagement, by a partial attack, or to take a position that shall oblige the enemy to make an assault upon us?" The council again determined against general engagement: but advised to strengthen the detachments on the wings of the enemy. General Scott was, in consequence, detached with fifteen hundred men to this service. Having a force rather superior to the British, General Washington conceived that the favourable opportunity to attack the enemy, ought not to be lost, and on his own responsibility, resolved to hazard a general engagement. JUNE 25.] Having learned that Sir Henry Clinton was moving towards Monmouth Court House, he detached Brigadier Wayne with a thou sand men to reinforce the troops in advance. He offered the command of the whole force in front to General Lee; but he, being opposed even to partial actions with the enemy, declined the service. The Marquis La Fayette joyfully accepted the command, which his senior major general had declined. The orders given to the Marquis were similar to those which had before been given to the officers on the lines, to gain the rear and right flank of the enemy, and give him all possible annoyance. The Commander in Chief put the main army in motion, that he might be in a situation to support his parties in advance. By these movements General Lee perceived, that more importance than he had imagined was given to the division in front, and he now importunately requested the command, which before he had declined. To gratify him without mortifying the Marquis, he was detached with two additional brigades to act in front, and the command of the whole, consisting of five thousand men, of course devolved on him. He was ordered to keep his detachments constantly on their arms and ever in a situation to attack. Sir Henry Clinton perceiving the approach of a powerful force, changed the position of his army, and placed his best troops in the rear. On the 27th, he encamped in a secure manner on the heights about Monmouth Court House. He could not be attacked in this position with the probability of success, and he was within twelve miles of strong ground, where he could not be assailed. General Washington therefore resolved to attack him as soon as he should move from his present encampment. JUNE 28. About five in the morning, the Commander in Chief was informed that the front of the British army was in motion; he immediately dispatched an aid de camp to General Lee with orders to move on and attack the rear of the enemy, "unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary," assuring him that the main body should seasonably move to support him. From the movements of the American army, Sir Henry expected an attack. Early on the morning of the 28th, General Kuyphausen marched with all the baggage of the British army. The grenadiers, light infantry and chasseurs, unincumbered, remained on the ground under the command of Lord Cornwallis, and with this division was Sir Henry. Having allowed time for General Knyphausen to move out of his way, Lord Cornwallis about eight o'clock took up his line of march, and descended from the heights of Freehold into a plain of about three miles extent. General Lee made his disposition to execute the orders of the Commander in Chief. Passing the heights of Freehold, he entered the plain, and ordered General Wayne to attack the rear of the covering party of the enemy in such a manner as to halt them; while he himself by a shorter road should gain their front, with the design to cut them off from the main body of their army. In the mean time General Clinton perceiving that strong columns of Americans were hanging upon his flanks, and supposing that their object was to attack his baggage now passing through defiles, resolved to halt Lord Cornwallis's division and attack the Americans in his rear, with the expectation, that General Washington by this manœuvre would be induced to recall his detachments in advance. This movement was made at the moment Lee was reconnoitring their covering party. He found this corps much stronger than he had supposed it to be, and the ground he thought unfavourable for an attack. In his rear was a morass which could be passed only by a neck of hard land, which rendered it difficult for reinforcements to reach him, and would impede his retreat should he be repulsed. He was finally induced by a movement of General Scott, to cross the ravine and regain the heights of Freehold. During these manœuvres, some skirmishing took place. As soon as General Washington heard the firing, he directed the troops under his immediate command, to throw off their packs and march rapidly to the support of the division in the front. General Lee gave no information of his retrogade manœuvre to the Commander in Chief. As General Washington was approaching the scene of action in advance of his troops, he met, to his surprise and mortification, the corps of General Lee retreating before the enemy, without having made any serious efforts to maintain their ground. He found General Lee in the rear |