"It

return made to him. Soon after he discovered, that this return embraced the whole quantity brought into camp, without deducting what had beer. expended; and that there remained on hand only sufficient to furnish the army with nine cartridges a man. While the greatest caution was used to keep this alarming fact a secret, the utmost exertions were employed to obtain a supply of this article of absolute necessity in war. Application was made to all the Colonies, and measures were adopted, to import powder into the country. The immediate danger was soon removed by an arrival of a small quantity sent from Elizabethtown, in New-Jersey. Under the perplexities which arose from the defect of arms, the want of clothing and magazines, from the want of engineers, and from the confused state of the staff department, the mind of General WASHINGTON was, in some measure, cheered by a view of the men who composed his troops. requires," says he, in a letter to the President of Congress, no military skill to judge of the difficulty of introducing proper discipline and subordination into an army, while we have the enemy in view, and are daily in expectation of an attack; but it is of so much importance, that every effort will be made that time and circumstances will admit. In the mean time, I have a sincere pleasure in observing that there are materials for a good army; a great number of able bodied men, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable courage." The details of the departments of the Paymaster, Quartermaster, and Commissary, fell upon General WASHINGTON, and he urged Congress to fill them. Being himself authorised to make the appointments, he called to his assistance the general staff, which is necessary for the regular support and expeditious movements of an army; and assiduously prosecuted plans to organize and discipline his troops.

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General Gage had, at his disposal, a force consist ing of eight thousand men, and, by the aid of his

shipping, he was enabled to direct it to any point of the extended lines of the Ame: icans, whose army d not amount to more than fourteen thousand and five

hundred men. General WASHINGTON was fully ap prized of his danger, and early summoned the General officers to deliberate upon the expediency of attempting to support their present position, or of taking one in their rear more compact. The council with unanimity advised to remain in their present lines. The reasons in support of this opinion were, the immediate effect which a retrograde movement would have to animate the British, and to depress the American troops; the unfavourable impression that would be made upon the publick mind; the devastation of the fertile country, that must be opened to the enemy, and the difficulty of finding a strong position in the rear. As a precautionary measure, it was determined that they would not take possession of the heights of Dorchester, nor oppose the attempt of General Gage to gain them. In case of an attack and defeat, the heights in Cambridge, and the rear of the lines in Roxbury, were appointed as places of rendezvous. The enemy was watched with vigilant attention; and any movements which threatened a distant invasion, were communicated to Congress, and to the Executives of the Provinces particularly exposed.

The eneiny had been taught respect for the American army by the battle of Bunker's Hill, and their plans, from that period through the year, were direct. ed to self defence. With little interruption, both ar mies were employed in strengthening their respective lines and posts. The few skirnishes which took place between зmali parties either in their nature nor their consequences merit notice.

The mere defence of lines did not satisfy the enter prizing and patriotick mind of General WASHINGTON

Judge Marshall denominates these heights, "Welch Mountains." This name is not known in their vicinity.

With extreme anxiety he noticed the expense of the campaign, without possessing the means of diminishing it.

He knew that his country was destitute of revenue and apprehended that her resources must soon be exhausted. In a few months the army of course would bo disbanded, and the enlistment of another he conreived to be extremely difficult, if practicable; powerful reinforcements to the enemy were, in the Spring, to be expected from England; and he thought it doubtful, whether proportionate strength could be collected in the Colonies to meet them in the field. He conceived it, therefore, of vast importance to the American cause to subdue the army in Boston, before it could be reinforced. An event of this magnitude would unite and animate the Colonies, and convince Great Britain, that America was determined in her opposition to the measures of Parliament. Under these impressions he often reconnoitred the enemy, and collected information of their numbers and strength from every possible source. The attempt to dislodge the British he well knew would be attended with extreme hazard, but it was his opinion, that the probebility of ultimate success, and the great advantages accruing from it, warranted the effort. In a letter to the General Officers, he stated the questions, to which he desired them to direct their close attention; and after sufficient time had been given for deliberation, he called them into council to determine, whether an attack on Boston should be made. The result wae an unanimous opinion," that for the present, at least, the attempt ought not to be made." To continue the blockade, and to strengthen their lines, was all that remained in their power.

Although the Commander in Chief acquiesced in the decision of the Council, yet it was evident, from nis letter to Congress, that he himself felt inclined t risk the attack. Probably this inclination was in

creased by the wishes of Congress, previously som municated to him.

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The scarcity of fresh provisions in Doston induced ale enemy to send small parties to collect AR BLOCK tong the shores of the contine withhu prosecting distance of their armed vessels l'us imposed a heavy bar den upon the towns on the seaboard, in the defence their property; and the Governours of severni ot the Colonies were frequent and importunate in their request to General WASHINGTʊs to delach forces from his army for their protection He was embarrassed by repeated requisitions of tas nature Fr. make t required detachments, would expose the mair army to inevitable destruction; and to deny the requests, would occasion dissatisfactions, which endangered a cause that could be supported only by publick opinion. To relieve him from this embarrassment, Congress passed a resolution, "That the army before Boston was designed only to oppose the enemy in that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments for the se curity of other parts of the country."

General WASHINGTON early gave an example of the humane manner in which he determined to conduct the war. By the representations of individuals from Nova Scotia, Congress was led to suppose that a small force from the American army, aided by those inhabitants of that Province who were in the American in terest, might surprise a British garrison at Fort Cumberland, at the head of the Bay of Fundy, and possess themselves of valuable military stores, if not retain the country; the measure was, therefore, recommend. ed by that body to their General. On examination he found that the stores were of no magnitude, and that the expedition would expose the friends of America in that Province to inevitable ruin, from the p' osecutions of their own Government, and he discountenanced the schome. The attempt was, however, eventually made by a few indiscreet individuals, but it failed, and in VOL. I.

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volveu the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, who engaged in it, in the predicted ruin.

Some of the American cruisers, acting without pub. lick orders, brought three of the principal inhabitants of the Island of St. John into General WASHINGTON'S camp; he treated them with the greatest tenderness. and permitted them immediately to return to their distressed families.

SEPT. 1775.

In the course of the Autumn, gradual approaches were made towards the British posts. The army being strengthened by the arrival of Morgan's Riflemen from Virginia, and a number of regiments from Connecticut and Rhode-Island, General WASHINGTON detached Colonel Arnold, with a thousand men, by the rivers Kennebeck and St. Francis, to co-operate with General Montgomery in Canada; and, if possible, to surprise Quebeck, the capital of that Province. Arnold, and about six hundred of his men, actuated by unconquerable resolution, with inconceivable fatigue reached Quebeck. The situation of the garrison corresponded with the presumptions on which the expedition was founded; but a number of circumstances, not open to human foresight, nor controllable by human prudence, rendered it unsuccessful.

Through the season, the highest endeavours of the Commander in Chief were exerted to procure arms and ammunition for his troops, and partial success at tended the measures adopted in every part of the union to accomplish this important purpose. A successful voyage was also made to Africa, and every pound of gunpowder for sale in the British factories on that coast was obtained in exchange for NewEngland rum. Capt. Manly, in the privateer Lee, captured British ordnance ship, laden with military stores, so completely adapted to the wants of the American army, that had Congress made out an invoice, a better assortment could not have been pro