sure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger or mischief, in relation to other powers.

1796.

It doubtless is important, that all Treaties and Compacts formed by the United States with other nations, whether civilized or not, should be made with caution, and executed with fidelity.

TREATY-MAKING POWER.

Having been a member of the General Convention, and knowing the principles on which the Constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment of the Government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion, that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur; and that every treaty, so made and promulgated, thenceforward became the law of the land.

It is thus that the treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations; and, in all the treaties. made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that, when ratified by the President, with the

advice and consent of the Senate, they became obligatory.

1796.

THE PRESIDENT, THE TREATY-MAKER.

The Constitution has assigned to the President the power of making treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate. It was doubtless supposed, that these two branches of Government would combine, without passion, and with the best means of information, those facts and principles, upon which the success of our foreign relations will always depend; that they ought not to substitute, for their own conviction, the opinions of others, or to seek truth through any channel but that of a temperate and well-informed investigation. 1795.

RATIFICATION OF TREATIS.

It is said to be the general understanding and practice of nations, as a check on the mistakes and indiscretions of ministers and commissioners, not to consider any treaty, negotiated and signed by such officers, as final and conclusive, until ratified by the Sovereign or Government from whom they derive their powers.

1796.

OPPRESSIVE TREATIES.

It is among nations, as with individuals; the party taking advantage of the distresses of another, will lose infinitely more, in the opinion of mankind, and in consequent events, than it will gain by the stroke of the moment.

EQUITABLE TREATIES.

Treaties which are not built upon reciprocal benefits, are not likely to be of long duration.

Unless Treaties are mutually beneficial to the parties, it is in vain to hope for a continuance of them, beyond the moment when the one which conceives itself overreached, is in a situation to break off the connection.

NATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS.

Our own experience, if it has not already had this effect, will soon convince us, that the idea of disinterested favors or friendship from any nation whatever, is too novel to be calculated on; and there will always be found a wide difference between the words and actions of any of them. 1797.

Nations are not influenced, as individuals may be,

by disinterested friendships; but, when it is their interest to live in amity, we have little reason to apprehend any rupture.

1786.

NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

I do not like to add to the number of our national obligations. I would wish, as much as possible, to avoid giving a foreign power new claims of merit for services performed to the United States, and would ask no assistance that is not indispensable.

1778.

No policy, in my opinion, can be more clearly demonstrated, than that we should do justice to all, and have no political connection with any of the European powers, beyond those which result from, and serve to regulate, our commerce with them.

THE POLITICS OF PRINCES.

The politics of Princes are fluctuating; often, more guided by a particular prejudice, whim, or interest, than by extensive views of policy.

CAPRICES OF MINISTERS.

The change or caprice of a single Minister, is capable of altering the whole system of Europe.

NATIONAL CANDOR.

Candor is not a more conspicuous trait, in the character of Governments, than it is of individuals.

NATIONAL SENTIMENTS.

I have always believed, that some apparent cause, powerful in its nature, and progressive in its operation, must be employed, to produce a change in national sentiments.

NATIONAL HONESTY.

Honesty in States, as well as in individuals, will ever be found the soundest policy.

1787.

RESOURCES OF BRITAIN.

In modern wars, the longest purse must chiefly determine the event. I fear, that of the enemy will be found to be so.

Though the Government is deeply in debt, the Nation is rich; and their riches afford a fund which will not be easily exhausted. Besides, their system of public credit is such, that it is capable of greater exertions than any other nation.