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TWO VIEWS OF DANGER.

Men who are familiarized to danger, meet it without shrinking; whereas troops unused to service, often apprehend danger where no danger is.

THE THREE INCENTIVES, IN BATTLE.

Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty, in time of action: natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment.

REGULARS AND RECRUITS.

Natural bravery and hope of reward are common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier; but fear of punishment most obviously distinguishes the one from the other.

THE COWARD'S BRAVERY.

A coward, when taught to believe, that, if he breaks his ranks and abandons his colors, he will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy; but a man who thinks little of the one, and is fearful of the other, acts from present feelings, regardless of consequences.

RAW MILITIA.

Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in arms,) are timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PATRIOT'S ONLY FEAR.

The virtue, spirit, and union in the provinces, leave them nothing to fear, but the want of ammunition.

1775.

MILITARY RANK, THE PEOPLE'S GIFT.

I cannot conceive one more honorable, than that which flows from the uncorrupted choice of a brave and free people, the purest source and original fountain of all power.

THE FREEMAN'S HEREDITARY PRIVILEGES.

Under God's providence, those who influence the counsels of America, and all other inhabitants of the

United Colonies, at the hazard of their lives, are de termined to hand down to posterity those just and invaluable privileges, which they received from their

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Single men in the night will be more likely to ascertain facts, than the best glasses in the day.

SURPRISALS OF THE ENEMY.

The usual time for exploits of this kind is a little before day; for which reason a vigilant officer is then more on the watch. I therefore recommend a midnight hour.

A dark night, and even a rainy one, if you can find the way, will contribute to your success.

PAROLE.

Several of our officers have broken their paroles, and stolen away. This practice, ignominious to them

selves, dishonorable to the service, and injurious to the officers of sentiment and delicacy, who remain behind to experience the rigors of resentment and distrust on their account, cannot be tolerated, whatever be the pretence.

I have made a point of sending those back, that have come under my observation; and I must desire you will do the same towards those who fall under yours.

1777.

A conduct of this kind demands that every measure should be taken, to deprive them of the benefit of their delinquency, and to compel their return.

1779.

REGULAR TROOPS, SUPERIOR TO MILITIA.

Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence; and, whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous.

No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest to the seat of war, are only valuable as light troops, to be scattered in the woods, and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy.

The firmness requisite for the real business of

fighting, is only to be attained, by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance, that can justify a different opinion; and it is most earnestly to be wished, that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence.

1780.

MILITARY POWER.

I confess, I have felt myself greatly embarrassed, with respect to a vigorous exercise of military power. An ill-placed humanity, perhaps, and a reluctance to give distress, may have restrained me too far; but these were not all. I have been well aware of the present jealousy of military power; and that this has been considered as an evil much to be apprehended, even by the best and most sensible among us. Under this idea, I have been cautious, and wished to avoid, as much as possible, any act that might increase it. 1777.

The people at large are governed much by custom. To acts of legislation or civil authority they have ever been taught to yield a willing obedience, without reasoning about their propriety; on those of Military Power, whether immediate, or derived originally from another source, they have ever looked with a jealous and suspicious eye.

1777.

Extensive powers, not exercised as far as was neces

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