receive from America succours against the parent country? It is impossible that that government should be ignorant of the armaments making in its ports. Too much publicity is given to them not to render it responsible, and it ought to preceive that it is contrary to every system of peace and good friendship, to suffer longer in its ports, armaments evidently directed against France.

Without doubt the federal government would not wish, in order to favour certain private speculations, to give new facilities to rebellion and robbery (brigandage); the tolerance of a commerce so scandalous would be unworthy of it. Neither your government nor his majesty can be any. longer indifferent to it; and as the seriousness of the facts, which occasion this complaint, obliges his majesty to consider as good prize every thing which shall enter the port of St. Domingo, occupied by the rebels, and every thing coming out, he persuades himself, that the government of the United States will take, on its part, against this commerce, at once illicit and contrary to all the principles of the law of nations, all the repressive and authoritative measures proper to put an end to it. This system of impunity and tolerance* can no longer continue; and his majesty is convinced, that your government will think it due from its frankness promptly to put an end to it. ** Receive, sir, the assurances of my high consideration. CH. M. TALLEYRAND.

(Signed)

To his excellency, GENERAL ARMSTRONG.

Faithfully translated,

J. WAGNER,

Chief Clerk Department State.

* Ne pourroit durer d'avantage.

MESSAGE

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RESPECTING THE APPLICATION OF HAMET CARAMALLI, EX-BASHAW OF TRIPOLI. JANUARY 13, 1806.

I LAY before congress the application of Hamet Caramalli, elder brother of the reigning Bashaw of Tripoli, soliciting from the United States attention to his services and sufferings in the late war against that state: and in order to possess them of the ground on which that application stands, the facts shall be stated according to the views and information of the executive.

During the war with Tripoli, it was suggested that Hamet Caramalli, elder brother of the reigning Bashaw, and driven by him from his throne, meditated the recovery of his inheritance, and that a concert in action with us was desirable to him. We considered that concerted operations by those who have a common enemy were entirely justifiable, and might produce effects favourable to both, without binding either to guarantee the objects of the other. But the distance of the scene, the difficulties of communication, and the uncertainty of our information, inducing the less confidence in the measure, it was committed to our agents, as one which might be resorted to, if it promised to promote our success.

Mr. Eaton, however, our late consul, on his return from the Mediterranean, possessing personal knowledge of the scene, and having confidence in the effect of a joint operation, we authorized commodore Barron, then proceeding with his squadron, to enter into an understanding with Hamet, if he should deem it useful: and as it was represented that he would need some aids of arms and ammunition, and even of money, he was authorized to furnish them to a moderate extent, according to the prospect of utility to be expected from it. In order to avail him of the advantages of Mr. Eaton's knowledge of circumstances, an occasional employment was provided for the latter as an agent for the navy in that sea. Our expectation was, that an intercourse should be kept up between the ex-bashaw and the commodore; that while the former moved on by land, our squadron should proceed with equal pace, so as to arrive at their destination together, and to attack the common enemy by land and sea at the same time. The instructions of June 6th, to commodore Barron, show that a co-operation only was intended, and by no means an union of our object with the fortune of the ex-bashaw; and the commodore's letters of March 22, and May 19, prove that he had the most correct idea of our intentions. His verbal instructions, indeed, to Mr. Eaton and captain Hull, if the expressions are accurately committed to writing by those gentlemen, do not limit the extent of his co-operation as rigorously as he probably intended; but it is certain from the ex-bashaw's letter of January 3, written when he was proceeding to join Mr. Eaton, and in which he says, " your operations should be carried on by sea, mine by land," that he left the position in which he was, with a proper idea of the nature of the co-operation. If Mr. Eaton's subsequent convention should appear to bring forward other objects, his letter of April 29, and May 1, views this convention but as provisional, the 2d article, as he expressly states, guarding it against any ill effect, and his letter of June 30 confirms this construction. In the event it was found, that, after placing the ex-bashaw in possession of Derne, one of the most important cities and provinces of the country, where he had resided himself as governour, he was totally unable to command any resources, or to bear any part in co-operation with us. This hope was then at an end; and we certainly had never contemplated, nor were we prepared to land an army of our own, or to raise, pay or subsist an army of Arabs, to march from Derne to Tripoli, and to carry on a land war, at such a distance from our resources. Our means and our authority were merely naval; and that such were the expectations of Hamet, his letter of June 29. is an unequivocal acknowledgment. While, therefore, an

impression from the capture of Derne might still operate at Tripoli, and an attack on that place from our squadron was daily expected, colonel Lear thought it the best moment to listen to overtures of peace then made by the Bashaw. He did so, and while urging provisions for the United States, he paid attention also to the interests of Hamet; but was able to effect nothing more than to engage the restitution of his family, and even the persevering in this demand suspended for some time the conclusion of the treaty.

In operations at such a distance it becomes necessary to leave much to the discretion of the agents employed: but events may still turn up beyond the limits of that discretion. Unable in such a case to consult his government, a zealous citizen will act as he believes that would direct him, were it apprized of the circumstances, and will take on himself the responsibility. In all these cases, the purity and patriotism of the motives should shield the agent from blame, and even secure a sanction where the errour is not too injurious. Should it be thought by any that the verbal instructions, said to have been given by commodore Barron to Mr. Eaton, amount to a stipulation that the United States should place Hamet Caramalli on the throne of Tripoli, a stipulation so entirely unauthorized, so far beyond our views, and so onerous, could not be sanctioned by our government; or should Hamet Caramalli, contrary to the evidence of his letters of January 3 and June 29, be thought to have left the position which he now seems to regret, under a mistaken expectation that we were at all events to place him on his throne, on an appeal to the liberality of the nation, something equivalent to the replacing him in his former situation might be worthy its consideration.

A nation, by establishing a character of liberality and magnanimity, gains in the friendship and respect of others more than the worth of mere money. This appeal is now made by Hamet Caramalli to the United States. The ground he has taken, being different not only from our * VOL. L

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views but from those expressed by himself, on former occasions, Mr. Eaton was desired to state whether any verbal communications passed from him to Hamet which had varied what we saw in writing. His answer of December 5th is herewith transmitted, and has rendered it still more necessary, that, in presenting to the legislature the application of Hamet, I should present them at the same time an exact statement of the views and proceedings of the executive, through this whole business, that they may clearly understand the ground on which we are placed. It is accompanied by all the papers which bear any relation to the principles of the co-operation, and which can inform their judgment in deciding on the application of Hamet Caramalli.

January 13, 1806.

TH: JEFFERSON.

Extract of a Letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Cathcart, dated Aug. 22, 1802.

"ACCORDING to information given by Mr. Eaton, he has prevailed on the brother of the Bashaw of Tripoli to repair to Malta, with a view to be with our squadron before Tripoli, and to be made use of against the Bashaw. At this distance it is difficult to judge accurately of the project, or to give particular instructions for the management of it. Although it does not accord with the general sentiments, or views of the United States, to intermeddle with the domestick controversies of other countries, it cannot be unfair, in the prosecution of a just war, or the accomplishment of a reasonable peace, to take advantage of the hostile co-operation of others. As far, therefore, as the views of the brother may contribute to our success, the aid of them may be used for the purpose. Should this aid be found inapplicable, or his own personal object unattainable, it will be due to the honour of the United States, and to the expectations he will have naturally formed, to treat his disappointment with much tenderness, and to restore him, as nearly as may be, to the situation from which he was drawn, or to make some other convenient arrangement, that may be more eli