Mechanicsville to Harrison's Bar, at | river, during the night," and open a 1,582 killed, 7,709 wounded, and 5,958 missing; total, 15,249." This may or may not include those abandoned to the enemy in hospitals, most of whom are probably numbered among the wounded. Lee's report does not state the amount of his losses, but says it is contained in "the accompanying tables;" which the Confederate authorities did not see fit to print with his report. He sums up his trophies as follows: "The siege of Richmond was raised; and the object of a campaign which had been prosecuted, after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, and upwards of 35,000 stand of small arms, were captured. The stores and supplies of every description, which fell into our hands, were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field; while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled." The "inaction" thus vaunted was mutual. Lee did not see fit to repeat at Harrison's Bar his costly experiment at Malvern; but, after scrutinizing our hastily constructed defenses, and guessing at the numbers and spirit of the men behind them, withdrew "to Richmond, leaving but a brigade of cavalry to watch and report any fresh evidences of activity on our side. None being af forded, he sent Gen. French, with 43 guns, to approach Harrison's Bar stealthily on the south side of the 45 List of killed, wounded and missing in the Army of the Potomac, from the 26th of June to the 1st of July, 1862, inclusive. Killed. Woun'd. Miss'g. Total. 258 1,240 1,581 fire on our camps and vessels, whereby we had 10 killed and 15 wounded, with some little damage to tents, &c. French desisted after half an hour's firing, or so soon as our guns were brought to bear upon him, and decamped before daylight. Gen. McClellan thereupon occupied and fortified Coggin's Point, on that side of the river; and was no farther molested. 1. McCall's division.... 2. Sumner's corps......... 187 1,076 3. Heintzelman's 4. Keyes' 97 3,074 176 848 2,111 189 1,051 Total.. 69 507 16 July 8. 47 July 31. OUR ARMY AT HARRISON'S BAR. 169 ghanies, less than 75,000 men not already on the James, including those under Gen. Wool at Fortress Monroe; so that to send him even 50,000 was impossible. reckless attacks on our strong posi- | there were, in all, east of the Alletions at Mechanicsville, Gaines's Mill, Glendale, and Malvern, being stoutly resisted, must have cost them very dearly. The official reports of two corps commanders show an aggregate of 9,336 killed, wounded, and missing; while other" subordinate reports indicate heavy losses in other divisions. On the whole, it is fair to estimate our total loss at 15,000 killed and wounded, and 5,000 unwounded prisoners; and the Rebel as at least equal to ours, minus the prisoners and the guns. The President went down 50 to the Army at Harrison's Bar, and found 86,000 men there. As 160,000 had gone into that Army on the Peninsula, he wrote for an account of the residue. Gen. M. replied" that his force then "present for duty" numbered 88,665; absent by authority, 34,472; absent without authority, 3,778; sick, 16,619; present and absent, 144,407. Of those absent by authority, he says that one-half were probably fit for duty; but, having got away on sick leave or otherwise, had failed to return. The AdjutantGeneral's office reported (July 20th) Gen. McClellan's army as numbering Gen. McClellan had telegraphed the President from Haxall's, on the morning of this battle, that: "My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops." Next day (2d), he telegraphed from Harrison's Bar that, "As usual, we had a severe-Present for duty, 101,691; on spebattle yesterday, and beat the enemy badly; the men fighting even better than before." Next day (3d), he telegraphed again to the Secretary of War that he presumed he had not over 50,000 men left with their colors;" and that, "To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this Rebellion, rëenforcements should be sent to me rather much over than less than 100,000 men." The President had advised him, the day before, that cial duty, sick, or in arrest, 17,828; absent, 38,795; total, 158,314. This does not include Gen. Wool's nor Gen. Burnside's force, then at or near Fortress Monroe. Upon a suggestion" from Gen. Halleck at Washington that deserters had reported the Rebels moving southward of the James, leaving but a small force in Richmond, Gen. McClellan ordered Gen. Hooker, with his own division and PleasanHowell Cobb reports that his brigade, of Magruder's division, went into battle at Savage's Station 2,700 strong; whereof but 1,500 appeared on the battle-field of Malvern, where nearly 500 of them were killed and wounded. Among the Rebel officers killed during the Seven Days were Gen. Griffith, Miss.; Cols. C. C. Pegues, 5th Ala., Allen, 2d Va., Fulkerson, commanding Texas brigade, and Lt.-Col. Faison, 3d N. C. upon one or the other, as he may elect; neither can rëenforce the other in case of such an attack. ton's cavalry, to advance upon and ments from the South. Gen. Pope's army, seize Malvern Hill. Through the now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about incompetency of his guides, Hooker's 90,000. You are about thirty miles from first attempt miscarried; but it was Richmond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, renewed the next night," and, not-ready to fall with his superior numbers withstanding the ample notice of it given to the enemy, proved an easy success; Hooker driving the Rebels from Malvern with a loss of barely, 14, and taking 100 prisoners; Col. Averill, with part of Pleasanton's cavalry, pushing north to White Oak Swamp Bridge, driving thence the 10th Virginia cavalry and capturing 28 men and horses. This advance, promptly and vigorously followed up in force, would doubtless have placed McClellan in Richmond forthwith. But Gen. M. had already received an order" directing a withdrawal of his army by water to Acquia creek, to support a fresh demonstration on Richmond from the Rappahannock; which order he began " most reluctantly to obey; of course, recalling Gen. Hooker from Malvern. He was now eager to resume the offensive with far smaller rëenforcements than he had recently pronounced indispensable, and suggested that, in addition to Burnside's men, they might be spared him from Pope's army on the Rappahannock and from the West. Gen. Halleck-assuming the correctness of McClellan's own mistaken assumption as to the strength of the Rebel Army of Virginia-replied with crushing cogency as fol lows: 56 "If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reenforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet tley must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water-say Fredericksburg-where the two armies can be united. * * * "But, you will reply, why not rëenforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview, that you required it was impossible to give you so many. 30,000 additional troops. I told you that You finally thought that you would have some chance of success with 20,000. But would require 35,000, as the enemy was you afterward telegraphed me that you being largely reenforced. "If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized; which would require several weeks. "To keep your army in its present position until it could be so rëenforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and, even after you receive the reenforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on "Allow me to allude to a few of the facts Richmond. in the case. "You and your officers at our interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large rëenforce "It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time-perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. "This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean August 6. 55 August 7. 56 RETREAT FROM THE PENINSULA. time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you. "In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers-indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me-are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment." Gen. McClellan forthwith commenced embarking his sick and five of his batteries, which had been assigned to Burnside; who, having been ordered on the 1st to Acquia creek, had immediately rëembarked his men, reaching his destination on the 3d, and promptly sending back his vessels to McClellan, who had been invested with complete control over the immense fleet of transports then in the Potomac, Hampton Roads, and the James. The latter commenced as if expecting to embark his entire force, including even the cavalry, at Harrison's Bar; but repeated and urgent messages from Washington, announcing" that the Rebels were crossing the Rapidan in force, and pressing Pope, soon impelled him to move the bulk of his troops by land to Fortress Monroe; the two leading corps (Porter's and Heintzelman's), preceded by Averill's 5 Gen. Victor Le Duc, who entered the service as Captain and A. Q. M., and who acted as Division Quartermaster throughout the retreat from before Richmond, and thence to Fortress Monroe, being promoted for eminent efficiency to be a Corps Quartermaster thereafter, thus sums up, in his private diary, under date of Sept. 1st-8th, 1862, the results of his experience and observation : "I am confident that there has been gross mismanagement in this whole affair. With all the resources that Government places in the hands of officers, the Army of the Potomac should have been transferred from the Peninsula to Acquia creek or Alexandria and landed, and 171 cavalry, taking that road on the 14th, crossing the Chickahominy by a pontoon-bridge at Barrett's Ferry and at Jones's Bridge; and Gen. M., with the rear-guard, breaking camp and following the army on the 16th; crossing and removing the pontoonbridge on the morning of the 18th. The retreat was covered by Gen. Pleasanton with the remaining cavalry. Gen. Porter was under orders to halt the advance at Williamsburg until the crossing was complete; but, intercepting there a letter which apprised him that the enemy were concentrating rapidly on Pope, with intent to crush him before he could be rëenforced, he took the responsi bility of pressing on to Newport News, which he reached on the 18th, having marched 60 miles in three days; and on the 20th his corps had embarked and was on its way to Acquia creek. On that day, the last of the army had reached its prescribed points of embarkation at Yorktown, Newport News, and Fortress Monroe." Heintzelman embarked at Yorktown on the 21st; Franklin at Fortress Monroe on the 22d; Keyes had been left at Yorktown to cover the embarkation, should any in as good condition as when they embarked, all within two weeks. Each corps as a unit should have been embarked and landed by itself, and its transportation have accompanied it; and, with the two wharves at Newport News, inconvenient as they are, three days and nights was ample time in which to put the transportation on shipboard; three days more would have been and one day in transitu-seven days. Three occupied in discharging it off and setting it up, corps could have shipped at the same time-one at Fortress Monroe, one at Newport News, and one at Yorktown. It has taken, in fact, nearly one month; and will be an entire month before all have arrived." This view assumes that sufficient transportation was always in readiness exactly where and when it was required; which is unproved. Rebel force be sent down the Penin- | bers, usually contrived to bring the sula on the track of our army; but there was none, and our retreat was entirely unmolested-the attention and forces of the enemy being now absorbingly devoted to Pope. Gen. McClellan and staff embarked at Fortress Monroe on the 23d, and reported at Acquia creek next day; coming up to Alexandria, by Gen. Halleck's request, on the 26th. Thus ended the unfortunate Peninsular campaign of the magnificent Army of the Potomac. Its unsuccess was due to the fact that the enemy nearly always chose the time and place of combat; and, though uniformly inferior in aggregate num larger force into action-fighting twothirds to three-fourths of his entire strength against one-fourth to onehalf of ours. Our commander, incessantly calling urgently for rëenforcements, never brought into action nearly all he already had, save that at Malvern the enemy forced a conflict before our army could again be scattered, and thus incurred a stinging repulse, though a large portion of our men were, even then, not enabled to fire a shot. Never before did an army so constantly, pressingly need to be rëenforced-not by a corps, but by a leader; not by men, but by a man. VIII. GEN. POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN. GEN. JOHN POPE, having been | Winchester, of whom 40,000 might summoned from the West for the be considered disposable. To Gen. purpose, was selected by the President, after consultation with Gen. Scott, for the command of a force to be designated the Army of Virginia, and to consist of all the troops then covering Washington or holding the lower end of the Shenandoah Valley. This army was to be composed of three corps, under Maj.-Gens. Fremont, Banks, and McDowell respectively; but Gen. Fremont was relieved, at his own request, from serving under one whom he regarded as his junior, and the command of his corps assigned to Gen. Sigel. The entire strength of this newly organized army was nearly 50,000 men, scattered from Fredericksburg to Rebel Army of Virginia, rendered Pope was assigned the duty of covering Washington and protecting Maryland, with its great railroad, while threatening Richmond from the north. He had at first intended and expected to advance to the neighborhood of Richmond, and there unite in the operations of McClellan against that city. But he was appointed on the very day' when Lee's designs against McClellan's right wing were developed at Mechanicsville; and, before he could concentrate his army, the retreat through White Oak Swamp to Harrison's Landing, by exposing his meditated advance, unaided, to a succession of blows from the entire |