I will mention one other reason for cultivating a pious habit of mind; it is the most common one, and perhaps therefore the best. Piety is the greatest and often the only solace in distress.. There are situations occurring every day, in which all human reasoning and philosophy fall powerless before the hopelessness of misery, but there is not and cannot be imagined one, in which habitual piety is not almost a perfect relief. Compared with the prosperity of life, there are scenes of suffering that pass all names of difference; but what can be imagined to happen on earth that can depress the heart of one, who has been in the daily habit of walking with God; and looking forward with joyful hope to the happiness of eternity as the great object of existence? What affliction will not such a one think light in comparison? We can hardly look abroad and see one unhappy man, whom piety would not make contented and even happy. Is he poor? He trusts in God that he shall not be permitted either to perish, or to suffer more than he can bear. Is he sick? It cannot be long; God will raise him up, or take him away to a better world. Has he lost friends and family? They are not lost to him; he resigns them for a little while, and thinks of death only as a temporary absence from those he loved. These are feelings which triumph over the evils of life, and which no one can enjoy, who has not made God the object of his contemplation in his hours of health and happiness. Piety is also the true and only secret of content. Is any one disappointed by the world? weary of its objects and pursuits? Is he one of those whom we sometimes hear complaining of the worthlessness of all things; who thinks his soul needs higher objects than any that are here presented to it, and looks with discontent on his own situation; and yet sees no other in the world for which he will labour or cares to exchange it? So miserable a state of mind is incompatible with piety. If such a man would learn what it is that cheers the weary christian, who knows as well as he, what is the worth of life, let him study the Bible. If he looks on this world as an end, instead of the means of reaching a nobler and better state, no wonder he finds it insufficient to his desire. It is man's nature to look forward to the future, and when all before him is within his reach, to find it of little value; it is so here for wise and great purposes; whether it will be so hereafter, we know not. It may be that we shall be changed in this respect when we are withdrawn from the low pursuits of earth, and shall be content with what we possess without needing the stimulus of hope. But it is more probable that this is an inherent and unchangeable property of the soul, and that in the future world we shall forever enjoy the pleasures 1 of a hope that never disappoints and is never exhausted by possession. Space enough may be imagined to exist in that boundless world, for the human soul to be forever finding every thing as happy as it expected, and yet seeing a happier beyond. How vain is it then for an inhabitant of earth to look for content, with. out that hope, which probably will be a necessary part even of heavenly happiness? The objects of life have just value enough to lead us on from childhood to that age when we at once see their vanity, and can discover and understand how boundless is the prospect which opens beyond them. Here they should be no longer objects of pursuit for themselves, but only as necessary steps to reach what lies beyond; means of exercising those virtues and duties, which will prepare us for better things. When this hope is once firmly established, how cheerily will man go through the labours of life-disappointment can never reach him if this hope does not fail, because his real object does not depend on his success in life, but only on his endeavours; what seems to others a fruitless undertaking, he may feel to have been more useful and profitable to him, than the most triumphant success. Every human hope will sometimes desert us; the strongest passions of our mortal nature will sometimes fail, and leave us languid and inactive; avarice may be tired of accumulating, and ambition may loathe applause: but this cannot be exhausted in life, because its object and developement are beyond it. And this reason would be good, even if the infidel could make us doubt whether there be a heaven; for until we know there is not, this hope, even if it were in vain, would be better than any thing life has to offer. And I repeat that this hope is one that will never rise to comfort us in an emergency; but it must be cultivated by constant and daily piety, and a habit of measuring every action of life by God's commandments. THE VALUE AND INFLUENCE OF TRUTH. The value of correct principles is not sufficiently understood. Truth itself is not duly estimated. With many persons practice is understood to comprehend the whole of duty; a good temper and a blameless and beneficent deportment are thought to be all that is required. It is maintained that opinions are of little importance; that the decisions of the mind are not under our control; that we cannot but believe according to the evidence presented to us; and consequently are not responsible for our religious faith. Two remarks suggest themselves New-Series-vol. IV. 2 in regard to these sentiments. The one is, that in this, as in almost all similar cases, there is a mixture of truth and error. The other, that there is a constant tendency among mankind to go to extremes in opinions as well as in conduct. As with one sect of christians, a correct faith is represented as every thing; with others, who seem bent only on receding as far as possible from their opponents, it is counted as nothing. Neither of these statements is correct; perhaps the truth may lie between them, equally distant from each; and when the mists of prepossession and prejudice are cleared away, she will present herself in all her native beauty and splendour. Now often there are such angry disputes about her, that she wisely keeps at a distance from the combatants, lest she should be insulted and abused; and will be found far from the scene of contention in some calm retreat; where vanity and prejudice and passion can gain no admission; and where she receives only the honest, humble, and candid votary. We propose now to inquire into the value and influence of correct principles of religious belief. We may thence derive motives to make them a principal object of pursuit. 1. We remark first, that faith is in itself a moral exercise. It is not always accidental or involuntary. Our opinions and belief are to a certain degree in our power; at least, they often depend on circumstances, which are within our control, and consequently we are responsible for the result. No reflecting person can be insensible that knowledge depends on curiosity and inquiry; that if we would see, it is necessary that we should open our eyes; and if we would embrace a compresive prospect we must take an elevated station. Truth may be found; yet it must be sought; it is discoverable, yet not always visible; it is plain, yet not always obvious. The success of our inquiries will depend much on the manner in which they are prosecuted. We may be diligent or remiss in them; superficial or profound; faithful or partial. The result will be materially affected by the temper of mind, with which we engage in them. We must have a serious disposition to discover the truth. We must be willing to embrace it. We must become superior to the influence of private interests, which might oppose its reception; and of prejudices and prepossessions, arising from our connexions or situation in life, from popular sentiment and fashion, and an unworthy fear of the reproach of singularity; and many other circumstances, which might hinder our discernment or acknowledgment of the truth. Above all, our moral character has an important influence on our views of religion. Are we not likely to reject doctrines, which condemn our tem : per and conduct? Is the proud man willing to admit those truths, which inspire only humbling views of his nature and condition? Is the man, abandoned to his sins and engrossed by the pleasures of vice, ready to acknowledge those doctrines, which disclose an ultimate moral retribution, which bring no peace to the guilty conscience, and awaken only terror and distress? Does it not daily appear, that vice is the parent of doubt and unbelief; and that as men begin to yield to their criminal appetites and passions, they begin to look on the truths of religion with distrust; to consider them as questionable and uncertain; to multiply doubts respecting them; to overlook or make a wrong estimate of their evidence; to search with eagerness for suggestions, which oppose their authority, force, or application; and does not a vicious life very commonly lead to utter unbelief, as well as unconcern, in religion? On the other hand, is it not exemplified by constant observation, that if a man will do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine of Jesus, whether it were of God or whether he spake of himself? Do not the love and practice of virtue predispose the mind to the reception of a religion, which inculcates moral virtue as the great business and end of life? Is not a benevolent disposition inclined to the reception of doctrines, which inspire love to God and man? Is not a virtuous mind, self-possessed and enjoying the calm approbation of conscience, and capable of estimating benevolent and religious motives and principles, and, from its knowledge of itself, willing to think well of human nature, the best preparation for estimating the moral evidence of christianity; that is, the evidence arising from the moral character of Jesus, and the inoral tendency and design of his religion; a species of proof, hardly less than irresistible, where it is weighed with due attention and by a mind capable of feeling its force. On all these accounts faith is a moral exercise. There are, it is plain, cases, in which belief is a virtue, and unbelief or error a sin, Where men are possessed of the ordinary capacity and means of forming opinions on religion, they are responsible for their opinions; and their belief or unbelief, the correctness or the falsehood of their religious principles is either a virtue or a vice, as far as it is the result of industry or negligence, of inquiry or indifference. As far as they may be affected by prejudices, which they might remove or counteract, or by their temper and course of life; or by other circumstances, which are within their control, these opinions have a moral character, and are proper subjects of moral retribution. It ceases to be unimportant what a man believes; his opinions as well as his affections must come into the account in an estimate of his moral worth; and may finally appear to his honour or shame, his triumph or condemnation. II. We inquire next, what is the connexion between truth and virtue, and the influence of moral and religious principles on our temper and conduct? We answer that their influence is reciprocal; as virtuous conduct leads to correct principles, so correct principles lead to a virtuous and pious life. What on this subject are the suggestions of reason and experience? Every kind of truth is valuable, because all truths have in some degree a common bond of connexion. The study and possession of truth invigorates and improves the mind. Truth and virtue, and, on the other hand, error and vice, are so closely connected with each other, and the intellectual faculty, by which we discriminate between truth and error, and the moral faculty, by which we distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice, are so intimately allied and so nearly resemble each other, that whatever improves the former, contributes in an almost equal degree to the benefit of the latter. As the intellectual discernment is quickened and strengthened, the moral discernment seems often to acquire acuteness and vigor. We remark farther, that the propriety of the decisions of the conscience, or the moral judgment, must depend greatly on the state of moral or religious knowledge; as the decisions of a judge are likely to be correct, other circumstances being equal, in proportion to his knowledge of the law by which our duties are regulated and our rights ascertained. Is it not true, if we appeal to experience, that in proportion to the improvement of mankind in the true knowledge of christianity, the sensibility of the conscience is increased; the moral discernment rendered more acute; men are accustomed to observe nicer shades of difference in moral conduct; the importance and obligations of virtue are more highly estimated; and a superior and constantly improving standard of moral duty and virtue is set up as the rule of life. We do not say, that the actual attainments of men in goodness are always in proportion to their intellectual improvement; but certainly whatever tends to enlighten the conscience, to quicken the moral sense, and to elevate the moral sentiments, must be favourable to virtue. III. We inquire next into the more direct influence of religious principles on human conduct. This must be considerable. We acknowledge that there are many moral and religious sentiments, which are not closely connected with practice; and many, about which there are warm contentions, of which it little concerns our virtue on which side our belief reposes. But there |