points, Ticonderoga, the highlands of New CHAP. II. York, and Philadelphia, against two powerful 1777. armies so much superior to him in arms, in numbers, and in discipline; it was necessary to make such an arrangement of his force as would, so far as was practicable, enable the parts reciprocally to aid each other, without neglecting objects of great, and almost equal magnitude, which were alike threatened, and which were far asunder. To effect this, if possible, the northern troops including those of New York, were divided between Ticonderoga, and Peck's Kill; while those from Jersey to the south, including North Carolina, were directed to assemble in Jersey, where a camp was to be formed on the high and strong grounds near the Raritan. The more southern troops were not drawn from that weak quarter of the union, but remained for its protection. If the army of Canada should join that of New York, by sea; the troops at Peck's-Kill, and those in Jersey, could very readily be united for the defence either of the highlands, or of Philadelphia. If Burgoyne should attempt Ticonderoga, by the way of the lakes, with a view of penetrating from thence to Albany, and thus obtaining the command of the Hudson, the force at Peck's-Kill was posted in such a manner as to furnish detachments to aid the American northern army.

These arrangements being made, and the recruits, who had all been carried through the

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CHAP. II.

small-pox, being collected, the camp at Morris1777. town was broken up; the small detachments called in; and the army assembled at Middlebrook, just behind a connected ridge of strong and commanding heights, not far from the Raritan, north of the road leading to Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick. Το this place, general Washington repaired in person on the 28th of May.

May 28.

This camp, naturally very defensible from the extreme difficulty with which it could be approached, was rendered still more so by intrenchments, and various works thrown up at different places, which appeared to be most accessible. The heights in front of the camp commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road to Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part of the country between that place and Amboy; so as to afford a full view of the most interesting movements of the enemy.

The force brought into the field by America, required all the aid which could be derived from a choice of strong positions, and from the most unremitting vigilance. It appears from a return made on the 21st of May, that the total of the army in Jersey, exclusive of the cavalry and artillery, then amounted to only eight thousand three hundred and seventy-eight men, of whom upwards of two thousand were sick. The effective rank and file were only

1777.

five thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight. CHAP. II. In this return, the troops of North Carolina were not included, as they had not then joined the army; and the militia of New Jersey, amounting to about five hundred men, were also omitted.

Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its inferiority in point of numbers must have limited its operations to defensive war; and have rendered it entirely incompetent to the protection of any place, which could only be defended by a battle in the open field. But more than half the troops * were unacquainted with the first rudiments of military duty, and had never yet looked an enemy in the face. An additional cause for diminishing the confidence otherwise to have been placed in them was, that many of the soldiers, especially from the middle states, were foreigners, many of them servants, on whose attachment to the American cause it was not safe entirely to rely. To avail himself of this unfavourable circumstance, general Howe had offered a large reward to every soldier who would desert, and had promised additional compensation to those who would bring their

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CHAP. IL. arms with them. The effect of these promises 1777. had been seriously felt, and their future opera

tion, especially among the servants who had been recruited, was greatly dreaded. To diminish this operation and to allure in turn, from the service of the enemy, those misguided Americans who had engaged with them, but might now wish to be again received into the bosom of their country, general Washington had urged on congress the policy of allowing all the advantages of freemen to the servants who had inlisted; and of giving full pardons to all Americans who would quit the service of the enemy. These recommendations, like almost every other proceeding from the same source, received the ready attention of congress, and resolutions were passed in conformity with them.

It was by no means an unimportant part of the plan of the campaign, as a movement by land towards Philadelphia was thought probable, to constitute on the western bank of the Delaware, an army of militia, strengthened by a few continental troops, under an experienced officer, to defend, in front, the passage of that river. Arnold was then in Philadelphia, employed in settling his accounts; and this service was intrusted to him.

General Sullivan also lay at Princeton with a body of continental troops, increasing in number by the recruits arriving from the southward

and with some Jersey militia. He had been CHAP. II. directed to hold himself in perpetual expecta- 1777. tion of the enemy, to send his baggage and provisions to places less exposed, and to be in readiness to move at any instant to a place of greater security, where his left could not be so readily turned, and from whence he might harass the flanks of the enemy on a march, and preserve a communication with the army at Middlebrook. He was directed by no means to risk a general action of his whole detachment, but to act entirely as a partisan corps, and on the first movement of the enemy to place his main body in security, and to harass them with parties detached for that purpose. Measures were also taken to put the militia of Jersey in readiness to take the field so soon as offensive operations should commence. It was intended, not that they should remain embodied for the purpose of strengthening and acting with the continental army, but that, ranging the country in small parties, they should hang upon, and harass the flanks of the enemy.

The first and real object of the campaign, on the part of general Howe, was the acquisition of Philadelphia. It had been proposed to renew the plan, which had been partly executed the last year, of marching through Jersey, and, after securing the submission of that state, crossing the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose, and

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