While Hamilton was employed in obtaining CHAP. VI. from general Gates an order for the march of 1777. the troops from Albany, very unexpected delays took place in moving those who had joined Putnam, and had been directed some time before to re-enforce with the utmost possible dispatch the army in Pennsylvania. The detachment from New York seems to have suggested to Putnam the possibility of taking that place, and he does not appear to have made very great exertions to divest himself of the force necessary for an object, the accomplishment of which would have given so much eclat to his military character. In addition to this circumstance, an opinion had prevailed among the soldiers, that their share of service for the campaign had been performed, and that it was time for them to go into winter quarters. Great discontents too prevailed about their pay, which the government had very negligently permitted to be more than half a year in arrear; and in Poor's brigade, a mutiny broke out, in which a soldier who was run through the body by his captain, before he expired, shot the officer dead who gave the wound. Colonel Hamilton came up in time to borrow money from the governor of New York to put the troops in motion, and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware. These several delays suspended the arrival of the re-enforcements longer than was expected. Those sent

CHAP. VI. from New York to general Howe were received 1777. rather earlier, and the expedition against Red

Red Bank evacuated.

Bank was on that account accomplished, and the place unavoidably evacuated before general Greene was in sufficient force to relieve it.

While lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and general Greene on the Delaware above him, an attack on Philadelphia was very strongly pressed by several officers high in rank, and was in some measure urged by that torrent of public opinion, which, if not opposed by a very firm mind, overwhelms the judgment; and by controlling measures not well comprehended, may frequently produce, especially in military transactions, the most ruinous disasters.

It was stated to the commander in chief, that his army was now in greater force than he could expect it to be at any future time; that being now joined by the troops who had conquered Burgoyne, his own reputation, the reputation of the army, the opinion of congress, and the public expectation, required some decisive blow on his part. That the rapid depreciation of the paper currency, by which the resources for carrying on the war were dried up, rendered indispensable some grand effort to bring it to a speedy termination.

The plan of attack proposed was, that general Greene should embark two thousand men at Dunks' ferry, and fall down the river in the night, so as to land in the town just before day,

attack the enemy in the rear, and take posses- CHAP. VI. sion of the bridge over the Schuylkill. That 1777. a strong detachment should march down on the west side of that river, and occupy the heights which enfiladed the works of the enemy, from whence a brisk cannonade should be carried on, while a part of the same force should march down to the bridge, and attack in front at the same instant that the assault on the rear should commence from the party which had moved down the Delaware. That the residue of the Continental army in three columns should attack the whole line of redoubts in front.

Not only the commander in chief, but the best officers of his army, those who would not be impelled by the clamours of the ill informed to ruin the public interests, were decidedly opposed to this mad enterprise.

The two armies, they said, were now nearly equal in point of numbers, and the detachment into Jersey could not be supposed to have so weakened sir William Howe, as to compensate for the advantage he would derive from his position. That his right was covered by the Delaware, his left by the Schuylkill; his rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by the city of Philadelphia, and his front by a line of fourteen redoubts, extending from river to river, and connected by an abattis, and circular works. These redoubts were well defended by musketry and artillery. It would be indis

CHAP. VI. pensably necessary to carry them all; since, to 1777. leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia, would be extremely hazardous. Supposing the redoubts carried, and the British army driven into town; yet, all military men agreed that nothing could be more hazardous than to storm a town. The streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of the Americans, which would attack them in front, while the brick houses would be lined with musketry whose fire must thin the ranks of the assailants.

A part of the plan, the happy execution of which would be essential to success, was, that the enemy should be surprised in the rear by the corps which was to fall down the Delaware. This would require too many favourable concurring circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the position of general Greene was well known, it could not be supposed that sir William Howe would be entirely inattentive to him. It was probable that even his embarkation might not be made unnoticed; but it was presuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed, to suppose that he could pass down the Delaware to Philadelphia, undiscovered. So soon as he should be observed, it would not be difficult to comprehend the whole plan, and to prepare for it. It would never be conjectured that general

1777.

Greene was to attack singly; and, of conse- CHAP. VI. quence, it would be understood that a correspondent attack would be made on the lines in front.

If the attack in front should fail, which could not be thought even improbable, the total loss of the two thousand men thrown into the rear must follow; and general Howe would consequently maintain his superiority through the winter.

The situation of America did not require these desperate measures. In the course of the campaign no considerable impression had been made. With great superiority of numbers, the British troops had indeed acquired the possession of some of the principal seaport towns, but they were enclosed in them, and could not obtain the command of the country, without risking a battle on equal terms, unless the army should destroy itself by some such enterprise. That their general would be compelled to risk such a battle, or to manifest his consciousness of inferiority to the American army; that the depreciation of paper money was the inevitable consequence of the immense emissions which had been made without corresponding taxes; and that it was by removing the cause, not by sacrificing the army, the depreciation was to be stopped. The corruption and defection of the people, their unwillingness to serve in the army of the United States, were