CHAP. I. arrangements of any country, engaged in war 1776. with an enemy of nearly equal strength; employing a permanent force, at all times capable of being used to its utmost extent, was demonstrated to the conviction of scepticism itself; and under the weight of this conviction, every effort was made by congress, though almost too late, to remedy the very extensive mischief which this fatal error had already produced. Not the least of these was the difficulty attending all attempts to cure it.

Men unaccustomed to submit their actions to the control of others, bear impatiently that degree of authority, and submit reluctantly to that subordination so indispensably necessary to their own safety, and without which an army, to use the expression of general Washington, when struggling to reform abuses of the most dangerous nature, " is an armed mob" incapable of being applied to the purposes of its creation.

Raw soldiers too can seldom be induced to pay that attention to cleanliness, to their persons, their lodging, their food, and to many other minute circumstancess, on which the health of a large body of men, collected together, essentially depends. They are therefore found to be infinitely more exposed to disease, and to be swept off by sickness in much greater numbers, than those who have been taught by experience the value of attending to those cir

1776.

cumstances which the young recruit never suf- CHAP. I. ficiently appreciates. Of this, the unexampled mortality, of both the northern and middle armies, furnished evidence as conclusive, as it was melancholy.

The total change experienced too in their situation, their duties, and mode of living, contributes, not a little, to render the military life, in the first instance, unpleasant to those who engage in it.

Habit conquers these impressions, and removes many of the causes which produced them. We, therefore, often see the veteran attached to the camp. But regulars engaged only for a short time, and militia engaged for a still shorter time, receive all these unfavourable impressions, without remaining long enough for them to wear off. They consequently acquire a distaste for the service, and on their return home, not unfrequently, spread( among their friends and neighbours, the prejudices imbibed by themselves.

These impediments to recruiting an army, would probably after the war had progressed for some time, occur in any state of things where the facts producing them existed; but in America, other adventitious circumstances added greatly to their influence.

Two winter campaigns had been made, in the course of the last of which, the soldiers, exposed half naked to a climate of extreme

CHAP. I. rigour, suffered excessive hardships, to which
1776. were attributed the diseases under which a

large portion of them perished. Old clothes
had been collected for them in Philadelphia;
but these supplies were late, and inadequate to
their wants.

These causes, checking the ardour at first
felt by the youth of America for the service of
their country, produced another effect, which,
in its turn, operated as a powerful cause to pre-
vent inlistments to serve during the war.
When, from a defect of regulars, repeated calls
were made on the militia, it was soon perceived
that many of those whose tour of duty was to
be performed, either from the interruption
which a short absence would give to their
domestic affairs, or from some other cause,
were extremely unwilling to take the field; and
chose rather to give a small sum of money to
a substitute. In a short time, more money was
given for a month's service in the militia, than
was offered to a soldier to engage in the regu-
lar service. This practice soon taught those
who would otherwise have inlisted, the su-
perior value of their services, when they retained
the disposition of themselves; and disinclined
them to engage permanently in the army.
The longer the war continued, the higher
was the price of a substitute, and of conse-
quence an increased bounty became necessary
to induce a man to inlist. Such was the effect
of these and other causes, that by the time

A

congress became convinced of the error which had been committed, the ability to correct it, if not entirely passed away, was certainly very much diminished.

The immense loss of arms, resulting inevitably from their being placed in the hands of troops who were soon to return home, and who could not be subjected to discipline while in camp, was also a very serious mischief.

Connected with short inlistments, and with the organization of civil governments in America, were other defects in the structure of the army, which produced no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment. It has been seen that in the commencement of the war, the troops were raised entirely by the local authorities, who, without consent, established military systems of their own, and appointed officers whose relative rank, and right of promotion, it was not very easy to adjust. The officers, like the men, were engaged only for one year, and, at the expiration of that time, were to be re-commissioned. Congress appointed the general officers, and took the armies raised by the respective colonies into continental pay. With considerable difficulty, a new army was formed out of these materials, in the face of the enemy, during the blockade of Boston. This work was to be repeated, with infinitely more difficulty, during the active operations of the campaign of 1776. The attention of congress

CHAP. L 1776. CHAP. I. was very early called to this interesting subject 1776. by general Washington; but that body performed its most important duties through the agency of sovereign states. Those states were to nominate the officers, and were requested to send commissioners to camp to attend to this object. So many delays were experienced, that the dissolution of the army approached, before officers were appointed to recruit that which was to take its place. At length, congress resolved, that general Washington should himself be empowered to appoint the officers for those states which had failed to depute commissioners for that purpose. The manner in which appointments were made, unfortunately brought into the service, as officers, men without capacity or sufficient weight of character to preserve the respect of the soldiers, and that discipline, which is essential to an army; and the repeated re-organization of the troops gave continual discontent.

The various independent authorities employed in raising the army, gave occasion to other very embarrassing circumstances. In order to complete their quotas, some of the states engaged to those who would inlist in their service additional pay to that promised by congress. The discontents excited by a disparity of pay among soldiers in the same army, will readily be conceived. The interference of the general with the state governments, to produce a depar