1777. About two thousand men were understood to CHAP. II. be in the neighbourhood of King's bridge, and the whole force on the island was not calculated at a much more considerable number. On Long island, it was said there was only Delancy's brigade of American loyalists, amounting to but little more than one thousand men. It was supposed that the militia of New England and New York would form a respectable army, with which general Heath might alarm, and perhaps more than alarm, that important post. He was directed to march down to the neighbourhood of King's bridge, to carry off the forage and fresh provisions with which the enemy might be supplied, and, if the prospect of succeeding appeared probable, to attack the forts which guarded the entrance into the island. It was expected that fears for New York might induce the enemy, either to evacuate the Jerseys entirely, in which event they must suffer extremely through the winter for fuel, forage, and provisions; or so to weaken their posts at Brunswick and Amboy, as to give general Washington an opportunity of attacking them with some advantage. If he should be disappointed in this expectation, and the enemy in the Jerseys should remain undiminished, he thought it not improbable that some important advantages might be gained on York, or Long islands. CHAP. II. 1 In pursuance of this plan, general Heath 1777. marched down towards West Chester, and summoned fort Independence to surrender : Kingsbridge, but the garrison determining to hold the place, Peck's-Kill it was thought by a council of war unadvisable General Heath moves down to but returns to without effecting any thing. to risk an assault with only militia; and, some intelligence having been received that the army from Rhode Island had embarked, and would probably land in their rear, they retreated to the Highlands without effecting any thing. A corps of Connecticut militia under general Wooster, and some New York militia under colonel Rensalear, were left to collect and bring away the forage and horned cattle, which were in considerable quantities, and would furnish the enemy with supplies they greatly wanted. About the same time, an expedition which had been planned by general Spencer against Rhode Island, where the enemy were between three and four thousand strong, was also abandoned. He had proposed landing near Howland's ferry, on a point of land which projects from the island, and is commanded by high grounds on the opposite shore, where the Americans had erected a battery: but general Washington directed that the attempt should not be made without the strongest probability of success; and as the eastern continental troops were ordered to Ticonderoga, it was thought unsafe to make so hazardous an attempt with only militia. " It is right," said general 1777. Washington on this occasion, "not to risk a CHAP. II. miscarriage. Until we get our new army properly established, it is our business to play a certain game, and not depend upon militia for any thing capital." In the mean time, every day almost produced skirmishes. some skirmish, which increased the distress of the enemy, and the confidence of the Americans in themselves. The British found it totally unsafe to forage but with large covering parties, which were often attacked with advantage, and their horses frequently taken. The miserable appearance they made, evidenced the scarcity which prevailed in camp. In these skirmishes, prisoners were often made, and repeated small successes, the details of which filled the papers throughout America, served very much to animate the people at large, who even supposed that, so soon as the season would permit the armies to take the field, the British would be driven to their ships for protection. Yet the real situation of general Washington, which was happily concealed in a great degree both from the enemy, and from his own countrymen, was extremely cri- State of the tical. He was often abandoned by bodies of the militia, before their places were filled by others, and thus left in a state of dangerous weakness, exposed to have his positions forced by the enemy. This was not the only inconvenience resulting from this fluctuating army. army. CHAP. II. They carried off arms and blankets which had 1777. been unavoidably delivered to them, to be used while in camp, and thus wasted in advance, the supplies collected for the use of the army, now recruiting for the ensuing campaign. While exposed to these embarrassing inconveniencies, the general received intelligence that re-enforcements were arriving from Rhode Island, and that the movement of general February. Heath towards King's bridge, had not produced the effects he had hoped for from that manœuvre. His fears for Philadelphia were again revived, and the New England troops under the command of general Heath, except so many as might be deemed necessary to guard the highlands, were ordered immediately to join him. Very heavy requisitions were also made on the neighbouring militia, especially of New Jersey. To obviate any objections which might be made to complying with these requisitions, by those who had taken the oaths of allegiance to the king of Great Britain, general Washington had, about the last of January, issued his proclamation, in which he discharged the obligations created by those oaths, and required those who had taken them to repair to head quarters, or to the quarters of the nearest general officer, and there swear allegiance to the United States, on doing which, a full pardon was granted to them. The beneficial effects of this proclamation were soon felt, and the people flocked in 1777. from every quarter to take the oaths; but the CHAP. II. The movement which he had with so much reason apprehended, was not however made, and the war of skirmishes on the side of Jersey, continued throughout the winter. In the course of it, the British loss was supposed to be more considerable than what they had sustained at Trenton and Princeton; and hopes were entertained that, from the scarcity of forage, neither their cavalry, nor draught horses would be in a condition to take the field to advantage, when the campaign should open. This light war, though all that could be attempted, was far short of the hopes which had been entertained by the American general. His energetic mind submitted with infinite reluctance to the inactivity his weakness imposed on him. He had flattered himself that the reviving courage of his countrymen would have placed at his disposal a force which would enable him to beat the enemy in detail, during the winter, and to repel the very great exertions which it was well understood would be made for the conquest of America in the course of the ensuing summer. All the intelligence from Europe concurred in demonstrating the fallacy of the hope, still cherished by many, that the war would be 1 |