CHAP. II. abandoned by Great Britain. Never had the 1777. administration been supported by greater majorities in parliament, and the body of the nation appeared well disposed to employ all its means to re-annex to the empire, by force, what were still deemed revolted colonies. The importance of destroying, or maiming the present army before it could be re-enforced was consequently felt in its full extent; and the commander in chief made the most strenuous endeavours to promote the recruiting service, and to collect the recruits in such numbers, as would enable him successfully to attack the enemy, either in Rhode Island, New York, or New Jersey. The state sovereignties, where the real energies of government resided, were incessantly urged to take effectual measures to fill their regiments, and to bring their respective quotas early into the field. They were pressed to march their recruits, so soon as they could be cleansed from the small-pox, by companies, and even by parts of companies, to the several stations assigned them; and those general officers, who were supposed to possess most influence, were detached to their respective states for the purpose of promoting and superintending the recruiting service.

Congress too, at the instance of the commander in chief, passed such resolutions as were calculated to second his views. They authorized him to draw the eastern troops from Peck's-Kill, who were to be replaced by New CHAP. II. York militia; and required the executive of New Jersey 'to order out the whole militia of that state, and the executive of Pennsylvania to order such part of their militia as was con

1777.

tiguous to New Jersey, properly armed and equipped, to the aid of the general. "It being,” proceed their resolutions, "the earnest desire of congress to make the army under the immediate command of general Washington sufficiently strong, not only to curb and confine the enemy within their present quarters, and prevent them from drawing support of any kind from the country, but by the divine blessing, totally to subdue them before they can be re

enforced."

These resolves were communicated in a letter manifesting the sanguine hopes of congress that the desire, expressed in them, would soon be realized; but to do so, required means infinitely greater than those placed in the hands of their general. Many concurring causes prevented the collection of a force competent to operations as vigorous and decisive, as the enterprising genius of the commander in chief had planned.

Such were the measures taken by several of the state authorities for appointing the regimental officers of their quotas, that their arrangements were not completed until the spring; and, even then, bitter contests concerning rank remained to be adjusted when

CHAP. II. the troops should join the army. The almost 1777. unparalleled sufferings which had been sustained

in a service where raw troops, unfurnished with ordinary clothing, had unavoidably been exposed to the hardships of a winter campaign, in the face of a superior army; the many deaths resulting from those hardships, and probably in some degree from an injudicious organization of the hospital department,* which was found to be the tomb of the sick; had excited very extensively a disgust to the service, and produced an unwillingness to engage in it. That enthusiasm which glowed in so many bosoms in the first moments of the war, which leads to great individual sacrifice for the public good, had almost evaporated; and the difference between the compensation allowed a soldier inlisted for three years, or the war; and that which might be obtained by occasionally becoming a substitute for persons called out to serve in the militia for short terms, became a subject of calculation extremely unfavourable in its result, to the completion of the regular CHAP. 11. regiments.

The recruiting service progressed slowly, and, instead of being able to execute the great designs he had meditated, the general entertained the most serious fears that the enemy would take the field during the winter, force his positions, and crossing the Delaware upon the ice, proceed to Philadelphia.

The frequent demands made on the militia, in consequence of this weakness of the regular army, were extremely harassing and distressing to the great body of the people. While but little real efficient force was acquired, great additional expense was incurred; and in those states most exposed to these calls, serious apprehensions were entertained for the agriculture of the country.

1777.

The real condition of the army during the winter, is exhibited in a letter from the commander in chief to congress, in answer to that which enclosed the resolutions which have been mentioned, and which expressed the brilliant schemes of victory in which the government at that time indulged itself. "Could I," said March 4. the general, "accomplish the important objects so eagerly wished by congress; confining the enemy within their present quarters, preventing their getting supplies from the country, and totally subduing them, before they are re-enforced; I should be happy indeed. But what

CHAP. II. prospect, or hope, can there be, of my effect1777. ing so desirable a work at this time? the enclosed return, * to which I solicit the most serious attention of congress, comprehends the whole force I have in Jersey. It is but a handful, and bears no proportion, on the scale of numbers, to that of the enemy. Added to this, the major part is made up of militia. The most sanguine in speculation, cannot deem it more than adequate to the least valuable purposes of war."

In pursuance of those cautionary measures, which were suggested by the mortifying weakness of his army, the boats on the Delaware were once more secured, and the public stores deposited in places supposed to be least exposed to the enemy.

The hope that, by a great exertion of heroic patriotism, a sufficient force might be collected, during the winter, to destroy the British army, and thereby at once terminate the war, being entirely disappointed; the views of the general were almost exclusively directed to the next campaign.

As the troops to constitute the new army were to be raised principally, through the agency, and by the authority, of the state governments; and congress could take no measures to fill up the regiments, other than such as were merely