1777.

recommendatory: in addition to the bounty CHAP. II. offered to those who would voluntarily inlist, the state authorities were resorted to, and different expedients were devised by them, to substitute other motives for that zeal for inde

pendence which had at first been relied on; but which, it was now feared, would not operate with sufficient force to bring the requisite numbers into the field.

In the New England states, where in consequence of the influx of money, produced, among other causes, by the sales of prizes, the depreciation of the continental currency began to be most sensibly perceived, the system formerly adopted, of giving increased pay to their troops, was resumed. But the strong remonstrances urged by general Washington against this measure, induced those states once more to abandon it; but they persisted in their resolution to encourage the recruiting service by an additional bounty. This, though indeed less pernicious than a partial augmentation of pay, was at first opposed as being calculated to effect in a degree, the same mischief. Finding however that the bounty offered by congress was no sufficient inducement to inlist, this voluntary aid of the northern states was assented to; and it would have been, perhaps, a favourable circumstance, had the example been imme. diately followed throughout the continent.

CHAP. II.

Even this measure did not produce the effects 1777. expected from it. The regiments continued to fill slowly, and it became every day more apparent, that the American army must still be inferior in number to the enemy, unless more energetic measures could be adopted. The critical situation of their affairs, and the necessity of bringing a respectable force into the field, were urged on the different states by general Washington, with all the earnestness to be expected from his situation, and zeal for the service. In Connecticut and Massachussetts, the country was laid off into districts, each of which was called on for its man, and, in default of producing, by a given day, a soldier inlisted for three years, or for the war, it was directed that one person, from those capable of bearing arms, should be drafted to serve until the first of the next ensuing January. This measure received the approbation of the commander in chief, who, though he deprecated any reliance on men whose terms of service were to be of less duration than that for which the whole army was to be raised; yet submitted to this, as perhaps the most eligible expedient of which the existing state of things would permit the adoption.

In Virginia, where the same difficulty attended inlistments, it was proposed by the executive to fill the regiments with volunteers, who should engage to serve for six months.

This plan was submitted to general Washington CHAP. II. by governor Henry, and his opinion asked con- 1777. cerning its adoption. "I am under the necessity of observing" said the general in reply, "that the volunteer plan which you mention will never answer any valuable purpose, and that I cannot but disapprove the measure. Το the short engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribed almost every misfortune that we have experienced."

In a subsequent letter to the same gentleman, the necessity of bringing a sufficient army into the field, should even coercive measures be resorted to, was very strongly enforced. At the same time, some alternatives were suggested, which, in a later period of the war, constituted the basis of various experiments to furnish the quota of troops required from that

state.

As the usual season for active operations approached, and the solicitude of the commander in chief to assemble his army increased; fresh difficulties, growing necessarily out of the organization of the American system, unfolded themselves. As every state was exposed to hostile invasion, and the enemy, in perfect possession of the ocean, could transfer the war at pleasure to any part of the union, the attention of the states was principally directed each to its particular situation. Each state in the neighbourhood of the great theatre of action

CHAP. II. contemplated its own danger, and claimed a 1777. portion of the protection due from the whole to

its parts. The spirit incident to every league, although the object of the confederation was perfectly the same with that pursued by each of its members, could not be totally inoperative in an empire, where, notwithstanding the existence of a head, the essentials of government resided in the members. It was displayed in an effort to give to the energies of the army such various directions, as would have left it totally unable to effect any great object, or to obstruct any one plan the enemy might have formed. The patriotism of the day, however, and the unexampled confidence placed by the state authorities in the commander in chief, prevented the mischiefs this spirit is so well calculated to generate. He represented to the governors, in strong terms, the immense advantages which the possession either of Philadelphia, or the highlands on the Hudson, would probably give to the enemy; and the powerful reasons for the opinion, that one or both of these great objects would be attempted the next campaign. That the continental army, when collected in its utmost force, would be scarcely competent to a defence of these important points; and, if weakened by detachments to cover every place exposed to the sudden and predatory incursions of the enemy, would be totally unable to effect any of the great pur

1

CHAP. II.

poses essential to the maintenance of the war. That although the British might harass the 1777. coasts and injure the maritime towns by their shipping, and by sudden debarkations of small bodies of troops, it was not probable that their general would attempt, at one and the same time, to make a permanent acquisition of various parts of the continent; since such a division of his force would probably defeat all his objects. It was indeed to be wished, but not expected, that this mode of carrying on the war might be adopted. To protect the coast against an enemy entirely in possession of the sea, was impracticable; and though the mischief resulting from these predatory expeditions might be considerable; yet they were expected when resistance was determined on, and could have no influence on the war, which was the great and common cause of all America. But if by detaching parts of the army, with the vain hope of giving security to places it was really impossible to secure, the main body should be so enfeebled as to permit the enemy to take possession of the strong grounds on the Hudson, both the upper and lower communication between the eastern and southern parts of the continent would be cut off, and the enemy would open to themselves a free intercourse between New York and the lakes.

These representations made their proper impression on the sovereignties now united, by a