about five hundred militia. General Wooster CHAP. IL who had resigned his commission in the con- 1777. tinental service, and been appointed major general of the militia of Connecticut, fell in with them at the same place; and they pro. ceeded that night, through a heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from Danbury. Here they halted; and having heard next morning, that the enemy, after destroying the town and magazines, were returning; they divided their troops, and general Wooster with about three hundred men fell in their rear, while Arnold with about five hundred, crossing the country, took post in their front at Ridgefield. Wooster came up with them about eleven in the morning, attacked their rear with great gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which he was mortally wounded, and his troops compelled to give way.* The enemy then proceeded to Ridgefield, where they found Arnold, who had only arrived about an hour before them, already intrenched on a strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute their passage. A warm skirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour, when Arnold was compelled to give way, and being unable to rally his men, retreated to Paugatuck, about three miles east of Norwalk. The enemy remained that night at Ridgefield, which they also set on fire, and

1777

CHAP. II. by break of day next morning resumed their march. They were met about eleven in the April 28. morning by Arnold, whose numbers increased during the day to something more than one thousand men, among whom were some continental artillery, and infantry; and a continued skirmishing was kept up until five in the afternoon, when the enemy reached a hill near their ships where they made a stand. Here the Americans charged them with intrepidity but were repulsed, and broken. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the enemy immediately re-embarked, and returned to New York.

The day before this detachment landed at Campo, twelve square rigged vessels, with some troops on board, sailed up the Hudson and anchored above Dobbs' ferry, where they were supposed to be stopped by a strong north wind, during which it was impossible for them to get further up the river. While this wind continued to blow, general M'Dougal received intelligence of the advance of governor Tryon on Danbury, and, in the hope of intercepting him on his retreat, while he should be pressed by the Connecticut militia, set out on the night of the 27th from Peck's-Kill with about twelve hundred men, and marching all night, reached Bedford, a town not far from the road leading from Ridgefield to Norwalk, next morning about ten o'clock. There he was informed of the hasty retreat of general Tryon, and despair

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1797.

ing of overtaking him, returned to Peck's-Kill, CHAP. II. which place he thought too important to hazard by a long absence at too great a distance from it. Had he arrived before Ridgefield was abandoned, the situation of the enemy would certainly have been rendered extremely critical. Notwithstanding the very decided inferiority of force opposed to them, the skirmishes were repeated with so much vivacity, that when they reached their ships, their ammunition of which they had received sixty rounds per man, is understood to have been entirely exhausted, and the men to have been rendered by extreme fatigue, almost unfit for further action.

The killed, wounded and missing of the enemy, amounted to about one hundred and seventy men. The loss of the Americans was represented by the British general to have been much more considerable. By themselves, it was not admitted to exceed one hundred. In this number, however, were comprehended, general Wooster, lieutenant colonel Gould, and another field officer, killed, and colonel Lamb wounded. Several other officers and volunteers were killed; and this circumstance, which was occasioned by the peculiar degree of danger to which the brave are exposed while commanding undisciplined troops, might have produced in the enemy an opinion, that the American loss was much greater than was in reality sustained. At the same time, it is to be recollected that,

CHAP. II. the action having been principally sustained by 1777. militia, suddenly collected, and suddenly dispersed, the accounts given of their loss may not be accurate.

In the magazines destroyed at Danbury were military and hospital stores to a considerable amount, which were greatly needed by the army; but the loss most severely felt was, upwards of one thousand tents, which had been provided for the campaign now about to open. The materials of which this important article is made, was so very scarce in the United States, as not to be attainable on any terms in sufficient quantity to replace those which were lost on this occasion. Yet it may well be doubted whether much was gained by the expedition. The destruction of the houses at Danbury and Ridgefield, served to increase the public irritation; the opposition experienced in a country totally unprepared for their reception, of whose militia a considerable part had been detached to the aid of a neighbouring state; and the celerity with which a body of two thousand men found it necessary to re-embark on board their ships, after having penetrated only twenty miles into the country; gave strong and public evidence of the difficulty which would attend an attempt to hold any part of the main land of New England. One object of the expedition is understood to have been to countenance the friends of the former government in that part of the state adjoining New York, and to give CHAP. II. them a safe opportunity of assembling round 1777. the royal standard. So far as this hope was entertained, it was completely disappointed. No recruits were obtained, and such as might have been inclined to favour their cause, instead of deriving confidence from the expedition, were rather discouraged from declaring themselves openly, by the precipitate manner in which this strong detachment had been compelled to retreat. In a letter to governor Trumbull on this subject, general Washington after expressing his regret for the loss which had been sustained, very justly remarked, "that from these events, we derive the consolation of knowing that the sentiments of the people are still powerfully directed to liberty; and that no impression of the enemy, be it ever so sudden and unexpected, will pass with impunity."

This enterprise was, not long afterwards, successfully retaliated. The enemy had been for some time employed in collecting forage and provisions on the eastern end of Long island. This country was supposed to be so completely secured by their armed vessels which perpetually traversed the sound, that the protection of the stores, deposited at a small post called Sagg harbour, for transportation to New York, was confided to a schooner with twelve guns, and a company of infantry.