General Parsons, who commanded a few of 1777. the Connecticut recruits at New Haven, a place of rendezvous from whence they were to be marched to Peck's-Kill, conceiving it to be very practicable to elude the cruizers of the enemy and to surprise this small party, and some other posts not very remote from it, in-. trusted the execution of his plan to lieutenant colonel Meiggs, a very gallant officer, who had accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec, and had been taken prisoner in the unsuccessful attempt made on that place by Expedition Montgomery. He embarked with about two hundred and thirty men, on board thirteen whale-boats, and proceeded along the coast to Guilford, from whence he was to cross the sound. Here he was detained for some time by high winds, and a rough sea; but on the 23d of May, about one o'clock in the afternoon, he re-embarked one hundred and seventy of his detachment, and proceeded under convoy of two armed sloops, across the sound, to the north division of the island, near Southhold. The east end of Long island is deeply intersected by a bay, on the north side of which had been a small foraging party, against which the expedition was in part directed, but they had marched to New York two days before. Here, however, information was received, that the stores had not yet been removed from Sagg harbour, which lies in the northern division of the island, and that the small guard still remained CHAP. II. for their defence. The boats were immediately 1777. conveyed across the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into the bay, where the troops reembarked, and, crossing the bay, landed about four miles from Sagg harbour, at two o'clock in the morning, which place they completely surprised and carried with charged bayonets. At May 24. the same time a division of the detachment secured the armed schooner, and the vessels with the forage which had been collected for the supply of the army at New York. These were set on fire, and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy were killed, and ninety of them taken prisoners. A very few escaped under cover of the night.

Having thus completely effected the object of his expedition, without the loss of a single man, colonel Meiggs returned to Guilford with his prisoners; "having," as was stated in the letter of general Parsons, giving an account of the enterprise, "moved with such uncommon celerity, as to have transported his men, by land and water, ninety miles in twenty-five hours." As a mark of their approbation of his conduct, congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed a resolution expressive of the high sense entertained of his merit, and of the prudence, activity, and valour, displayed by himself and his party, in this expedition.

CHAP. II.

The solicitude of the state governments to 1777. retain within their respective limits, and for partial objects, a part of the force raised for the general defence, was not the only interference with the plan formed by the commander in chief for the conduct of the ensuing campaign.

April 10.

Congress feeling a particular apprehension for Philadelphia, resolved, "that a camp be immediately formed on the western side of the Delaware, to which the continental troops in Philadelphia, and on their march from the southward and westward, should be ordered to repair with all expedition.

"That it be recommended to the supreme executive council of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to put not less than three thousand of the militia of that state in readiness to march to the camp before mentioned, on the shortest notice."

These resolutions, however, were accompanied with an order, "that general Washington be immediately informed by express of the resolves agreed on; and that he be informed that congress mean not by forming a camp on the west of Delaware, to delay the continental troops, or to prevent their joining the army under his command, as fast as he shall think proper to order them."

The judgment of the commander in chief was completely made up respecting the disposition of his army when it should first take the

1777.

field. He was entirely convinced that, while CHAP. 11. general Burgoyne would either endeavour to take Ticonderoga, and to penetrate from thence through the country to the Hudson, or would join the grand army at New York by sea; ge. neral Howe would either endeavour by moving up that river to possess himself of the forts and high grounds at present occupied by the Americans, or would attempt Philadelphia. That the one or the other plan of operations would be adopted, he did not doubt; but he possessed no means of deciding which would be the first object of the campaign. He had therefore determined to take post on the high grounds in Jersey, something to the north of the road leading through Brunswick to Philadelphia. This position was recommended by many considerations. It afforded to Philadelphia the same protection which could have been given by his army on the west side of the Delaware, while it covered great part of the state of Jersey; and possessed this additional advantage, that he might with great facility move from thence to the highlands on the Hudson,* should the operations of the enemy take that direction. This being his decided opinion, and his army

* Generals Greene and Knox, had been directed soon after the troops were placed in winter quarters, to view all the posts commanding the passes through the highlands on the Hudson, in order to the adoption of a more improved system for their defence.

1

CHAP. II. being too weak to admit of division, he re1777. quested that the camp on the west of the Delaware, if formed, should be composed entirely of militia, and that the continental troops should be pressed forward with the utmost possible dispatch, to join him in the Jerseys.

That the events of the next campaign would be of great, perhaps, of decisive importance to the issue of the war, and the independence of the country, had been long expected by the commander in chief, who had used through the winter, every human effort to prepare the means of giving it a favourable termination. Congress, and the state governments, had been pressed with the most anxious solicitude on the subject of raising men. Though his early hopes respecting the number of regular troops, which would compose his army, had been cruelly disappointed; and he not only found himself in a situation by no means adapted to carry into effect the active and offensive system of operations he had meditated, but scarcely capable of maintaining defensive war; he still preserved that steady and persevering courage, which had supported himself and the American cause, through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year; and that solid judgment which applies to the best advantage those means, which are attainable, however inadequate they may be.

In the uncertainty with which the first movements of the enemy were yet enveloped, and the equal necessity of defending the three great