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shipping, he was enabled to direct it to any point of the extended lines of the Americans, whose army did not amount to more than fourteen thousand and five hundred men. General WASHINGTON was fully apprized of his danger, and early summoned the General officers to deliberate upon the expediency of at-. tempting to support their present position, or of taking one in their rear more compact. The council with unanimity advised to remain in their present lines. The reasons in support of this opinion were, the immediate effect which a retrograde movement would have to animate the British, and to depress the American troops; the unfavourable impression that would be made upon the publick mind; the devastation of the fertile country, that must be opened to the enemy, and the difficulty of finding a strong position in the rear. As a precautionary measure, it was determined that they would not take possession of the heights of Dorchester, nor oppose the attempt of General Gage to gain them. In case of an attack and defeat, the heights in Cambridge,* and the rear of the lines in Roxbury, were appointed as places of rendezvous. The enemy was watched with vigilant attention; and any movements which threatened a distant invasion, were communicated to Congress, and to the Executives of the Provinces particularly exposed.

The enemy had been taught respect for the Ameri can army by the battle of Bunker's Hill, and their plans, from that period through the year, were directed to self defence. With little interruption, both armies were employed in strengthening their respective lines and posts. The few skirmishes which took place between small parties neither in their nature nor their consequences merit notice.

The mere defence of lines did not satisfy the enter prizing and patriotick mind of General WASHINGTON.

Judge Marshall denominates these heights, "Welch Mountains." This name is not known in their vicinity.

With extrome anxiety he noticed the expense of the campaign, without possessing the means of diminishing it

He knew that his country was destitute of revenue, and apprehended that her resources must soon be exhausted. In a few months the army of course would be disbanded, and the enlistment of another he conceived to be extremely difficult, if practicable; powerful reinforcements to the enemy were, in the Spring, to be expected from England; and he thought it doubtful, whether proportionate strength could be collected in the Colonies to meet them in the field. He conceived it, therefore, of vast importance to the American cause to subdue the army in Boston, before it could be reinforced. An event of this magnitude would unite and animate the Colonies, and convince Great Britain, that America was determined in her opposition to the measures of Parliament. Under these impressions he often reconnoitred the enemy, and collected information of their numbers and strength from every possible source. The attempt to dislodge the British he well knew would be attended with extreme hazard, but it was his opinion, that the probability of ultimate success, and the great advantages accruing from it, warranted the effort. In a letter to the General Officers, he stated the questions, to which he desired them to direct their close attention; and after sufficient time had been given for deliberation, he called them into council to determine, whether an attack on Boston should be made. The result was an unanimous opinion, " that for the present, at least, the attempt ought not to be made." To continue the blockade, and to strengthen their lines, was all that remained in their power.

Although the Commander in Chief acquiesced in the decision of the Council, yet it was evident, from his letter to Congress, that he himself felt inclined to risk the attack. Probably this inclination was in

creased by the wishes of Congress, previously sommunicated to him.

The scarcity of fresh provisions in Boston induced the enemy to send small parties to collect the stock along the shores of the continent, within protecting distance of their armed vessels. This imposed a heavy bur den upon the towns on the seaboard, in the defence of their property; and the Governours of several of the Colonies were frequent and importunate in their request to General WASHINGTON to detach forces from his army for their protection. He was embarrassed by repeated requisitions of this nature. To make the required detachments, would expose the main army to inevitable destruction; and to deny the requests, would occasion dissatisfactions, which endangered a cause that could be supported only by publick opinion. To relieve him from this embarrassment, Congress passed a resolution, “That the army before Boston was designed only to oppose the enemy in that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments for the se curity of other parts of the country."

General WASHINGTON early gave an example of the humane manner in which he determined to conduct the war. By the representations of individuals from Nova Scotia, Congress was led to suppose that a small force from the American army, aided by those inhabitants of that Province who were in the American interest, might surprise a British garrison at Fort Cumberland, at the head of the Bay of Fundy, and possess themselves of valuable military stores, if not retain the country; the measure was, therefore, recommended by that body to their General. On examination he found that the stores were of no magnitude, and that the expedition would expose the friends of America in that Province to inevitable ruin, from the prosecutions of their own Government, and he discountenanced the scheme. The attempt was, however, eventually made by a few indiscreet individuals, but it failed, and in VOL. I.

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volved the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, who engaged in it, in the predicted ruin.

Some of the American cruisers, acting without publick orders, brought three of the principal inhabitants of the Island of St. John into General WASHINGTON'S camp; he treated them with the greatest tenderness, and permitted them immediately to return to their distressed families.

SEPT. 1775.

In the course of the Autumn, gradual approaches were made towards the British posts. The army being strengthened by the arrival of Morgan's Riflemen from Virginia, and a number of regiments from Connecticut and Rhode-Island, General WASHINGTON detached Colonel Arnold, with a thousand men, by the rivers Kennebeck and St. Francis, to co-operate with General Montgomery in Canada; and, if possible, to surprise Quebeck, the capital of that Province. Arnold, and about six hundred of his men, actuated by unconquerable resolution, with inconceivable fatigue reached Quebeck. The situation of the garrison corresponded with the presumptions on which the expedition was founded; but a number of circumstances, not open to human foresight, nor controllable by human prudence, rendered it unsuccessful.

Through the season, the highest endeavours of the Commander in Chief were exerted to procure arms and ammunition for his troops, and partial success at tended the measures adopted in every part of the union to accomplish this important purpose. A successful voyage was also made to Africa, and every pound of gunpowder for sale in the British factories on that coast was obtained in exchange for NewEngland rum. Capt. Manly, in the privateer Lee, captured a British ordnance ship, laden with military stores, so completely adapted to the wants of the American army, that had Congress made out an invoice, a better assortment could not have been pro

cured. Considerations respecting the re-enlistment of the army lay with immense weight on the mind of General WASHINGTON, and he repeatedly invited the attention of Congress to this subject. In September, Congress appointed a Committee of their own boay to repair to Head Quarters, to consult with the Commander in Chief, and the Executives of the New-England Provinces, "on the most effectual method of continuing, supporting, and regulating a Continental ar my." The result of their deliberation was, that the new army should consist of twenty thousand three hundred and seventy-two inen; but unhappily, the men were to be enlisted only for one year. The evils resulting from short enlistments were severely felt at the close of the next campaign, even to the utmost hazard of the independence of the country.

Various causes operated to lead Congress to the almost fatal plan of temporary military establishments. Among the most important of these, was a prospect of accommodation with the parent state. Want of experience in the management of war upon an extensive scale was another. The revolutionary conflict placed the people of America in a situation in which all the energies of the human mind are brought into action, and man makes his noblest efforts; the occasion called upon the publick theatre statesmen and warriours, who, by the wise and honourable execution of the complicat ed duties of their new characters, surprised the world; still from them errours of inexperience were to be expected. The fear of accumulating expense, which the resources of the country could not discharge, had a leading influence to deter the American Government from the adoption of permanent military establishments; although the recommendations of Congress, and the regulations of State Conventions had, in the day of enthusiasm, the force of law, yet the ruling power thought it inexpedient to attempt to raise large sums by direct taxes, at a time wher. the commerce of

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