In another passage, adduced by the conductors of the Spectator, Calvin endeavours, as he often did, to distinguish his system from that of the Manichæans. It would not be easy fully to explain the passage without giving some account of the latter system. I believe, it is not necessary to add any thing in relation to it to the remarks already made. I notice it principally for the sake of observing, that there is what I presume to be an error of the press in one of the words put in italics;-the word. printed' weakness' ought to be 'wickedness. I believe it is unnecessary, likewise, to say any thing further respecting the few words quoted from the Westminster Confession, and the reference to that work.

The conductors of the Spectator give also a quotation from Edwards. What were the notions of this writer respecting the nature with which men are created, fully appears from the extracts adduced by me. In the part of his work on Original Sin, from which the few words in the Spectator are taken, he is disposed to maintain this theory-that the natural will, powers and faculties of man are so prone to all evil, that they can be restrained from it only by the supernatural operation of the spirit of God; and that it is therefore in consequence of God's withholding this supernatural grace, that men are sinners, and not in consequence of what Edwards calls any positive cause or influence from him, Thus man,' he says, 'was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption, and ruin, nothing but flesh without spirit.' The doctrine of Edwards is that men, as created by God, have natures so corrupt, that it is not necessary for him to exert any positive influence to make them sinners, or to infuse into their natures any new principle of evil. There is nothing in this statement, I believe, inconsistent with the quotations which I have before given from this writer.

With regard to Ridgeley, the author of a system of divinity, a writer of no note or authority, the passage quoted from him certainly appears to be Anti-calvinistic. I have not taken the trouble to examine its connexion, and ascertain whether this arise from ignorance of the proper use of language, or from any other cause. I do not even know whether Ridgeley himself did or did not pretend to be a Calvinist; and though the question might easily be settled, it is not worth the labour of half an hour that might be required to settle it. If he called himself a Calvinist, it is not from such authorities that we are to learn what Calvinism is. He might, for any thing I know, have been as ignorant on the subject, as the conductors of the Christian Spectator are, or appear to be.

With regard to the second proposition ascribed to me; 1 have implied it in my letter to be a doctrine of Calvinism, that God creates men with a nature which necessarily makes them objects of his vengeance.' The conductors of the Spectator profess to understand me as saying, that God creates men with a nature which, by a physical necessity, makes them objects of his vengeance, by causing them to fall into actual sins. A physical necessity they say, I must mean; and if they do not understand me as meaning a necessity which is the cause of men's actual sins, their remarks have no sort of bearing on the proposition imputed to me. But in my letter, I have proved it to be a doctrine of Calvinism, that men from their very nature, without reference to any actual sins, are odious in the sight of God, and objects of his vengeance; that their very nature necessarily makes or causes them to be so; and I have illustrated this doctrine by the case of infants, who before any actual sins, are according to the express assertions of Calvin and Edwards, and the implied doctrine of the Westminster Divines, subjects of damnation. After having shown this to be an article of the Calvinistic faith, I begin the next paragraph with the hypothetical statement of it.* The conductors of the Spectator have not attended to the facts which I have established in my letter. If these gentlemen really know nothing of the system, they have undertaken to defend, but what has been taught them in this controversy, I wish at least that they would read and endeavour to understand the statements and proofs which I have laid before them.

IT is, however, a doctrine of Calvinism, that the actual sins of men are the necessary consequence of the corrupt nature of man. The conductors of the Spectator have understood me as affirming this proposition; and to the proposition, considered in itself, they obviously have nothing to object. They themselves say, that according to Calvin: 'It is by a moral necessity,' that 'God is good, or that man is evil. They are obviously believers of what is called the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity. They will not therefore deny it to be their belief, that the actions of men are determined by a moral necessity; that is, a necessity arising from the moral constitution of their nature, as acted upon by the motives presented to it. What then is their objection to the proposition ascribed to me? Why they say, that though the actions of men are necessary; yet I must have meant that, according to the system of Calvinism, they are determined by a physical necessity. This, to be sure, in the sense in which 'physical necessity' seems to be understood by them, would have been a most extraordinary statement on my part; for they mean, if they mean any thing by this term, a necessity controling men's actions in opposition to their volitions. What then is the ground of ascribing to me a statement, which on the face of it is incredible I should have made. The answer is, that I must have meant 'a physical necessity; because a little after, I state hypothetically the proposition, as a doctrine of Calvinism, that 'men, as moral agents, can do nothing to deliver themselves from the curse of God." This is the Calvinistic doctrine of the moral inability of man 'to have or do any good thing.' Now though I have been unnecessarily accurate in the hypothetical statement of this doctrine; though to exclude all pretence for misrepresentation, I have introduced the words 'as moral agents; yet on the ground of this sentence solely, the conductors of the Spectator, charge me with affirming not a moral, but a physical necessity. It is impossible, here, to suspect any dishonest artifice. The inference actually made by them, is too plainly the direct opposite of that which they ought to have made, for any one to imagine them to have reasoned in this manner, with an intention of misrepresenting or deceiving. It is an honest blunder, without doubt, though a very gross one; and such being the case, one ought to be very tender in charging the conductors of the Spectator with intentional misrepresentation, whatever strange accounts they may hereafter give of the opinions or statements of any writer. It is possible, for instance, that they may really have misunderstood Calvin, when they pretend, as they do in their last note, that he maintained 'freedom from necessity' to belong to man in his fallen state; though Calvin in the chapter from which they quote, repeats over and over again, expressions like the following, that 'man is hemmed in on every side by a wretched necessity, miserrima undique necessitate circumseptus; and though the very title of the chapter is, that' man is despoiled of liberty of will, and subjected to a miserable servitude.'

One main purpose of the latter part of their notice is evidently to inculcate the doctrine, that, though what they call a physical necessity would destroy moral accountability, yet a moral necessity does not;-so that though man by nature is ' utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all that is spiritually good, and inclined to all evil, and that continually; yet that on this account, he is not at all less 'justly liable to all punishments in this world and in that to come, for not doing what by nature he is disabled from doing. I have never denied this to be a doctrine of Calvinism. On the contrary, I affirm it to be so.

There are some expressions in their notice which have nothing to do with the present controversy, but by which many of their readers may be liable to be deceived. They speak of men as' beings who transgress and suffer only of their free choice; and as not being subject to any necessity which destroys or impairs their entire liberty." It is their business, certainly not mine, to reconcile these expressions with the statements respecting the nature and condition of man, which I have adduced from Cal. vinistic authorities. The fact is, that the conductors of the Spectator have indulged in rather a licentious use of the freedom, which some modern defenders of the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity have assumed, of employing certain terms in a technical and deceptive sense, wholly foreign from their popular acceptation. When for instance, it is said that the actions of men are free, nothing more is meant, than that man has the natural power to act conformably to his volitions, that is, if he wills to exert his body or his mind, he is able to do it; there is no compulsion exercised upon him to prevent it. But it is maintained at the same time, that every act of his will is necessarily determined to be what it is, by his own nature and the constitution of things which God has appointed. With regard to the implied proposition, that men 'transgress, and suffer only of their free choice, the conductors of the Spectator have asserted what neither the doctrines of their professed creed, (if they claim to be Calvinists.) nor the language of their professed philosophy (if they think themselves necessarians) will either warrant or

excuse.

What Calvin thought of the language which has been used by modern necessarians, may be learnt from an honest passage, which I am about to quote. With regard to the particular expression just noticed, it will be perceived, as before, that the conductors of the Spectator contradict his authority; and that there is no contradiction between Calvin and myself. The object of the second chapter of the second book of his Institutes, as stated in its title, is, as I have said, to prove, that 'man in his present state is despoiled of freedom of will; and subjected to a miserable slavery.' He quotes and opposes the opinions of different writers, who thought that freedom of will, might in one sense or another be ascribed to man, and finally mentions that of Peter Lombard. Lombard he says, 'decides that our will is free, not because we are equally able to do or to think what is good or what is evil; but only because we are free from compulsion (coactione soluti sumus;) which liberty may exist, notwithstanding we are corrupted, and are slaves of sin, and can do nothing but sin.'

Upon this Calvin immediately remarks :

'According to this, man will be said to possess freedom of will, NOT BECAUSE HE HAS A FREE CHOICE EQUALLY OF GOOD AND EVIL, but because he does evil conformably to his will and not by compulsion. This is very true; but what purpose was to be answered by giving so proud a title to a thing of so little importance? An admirable kind of liberty indeed, if man be under no compulsion to serve sin, but is yet such a willing slave, that his will is held bound by the fetters of sin. I abominate disputes about words, by which the Church is disturbed without any good result; but I think we ought religiously to avoid those words which appear to express an absurdity; especially on a subject respecting which there are pernicious errors. For how many are there, I pray, who when they hear freedom of will ascribed to man, do not immediately conceive of him, as master of his own mind and will, so as to be able to direct himself to either side, [either good or evil ?] But, it may be said, that this danger will be removed, if the common people are carefully informed of the sense in which the term is used. This is not true; the human mind is of itself so prone to false opinions, that it will more readily imbibe error from a single word, than truth from a long discourse."

Such was the opinion of Calvin concerning that abuse of language to which modern necessarians, have resorted; and so far was he from thinking with the conductors of the Spectator, that men 'transgress, and suffer only of their free choice.'

In relation to this subject, the conductors of the Spectator bring forward a single passage from the Westminster Confession, as follows:

'God hath indued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to do good or evil.'

If it had been their object to show what the Westminster Divines really believed respecting the nature of man, it would have been a little more to the purpose, to have quoted the next proposition but one to that given by them.

Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself or to prepare hiinself thereunto.'

It must be an affair, I think, of some deliberation and difficulty for them to reconcile the meaning which they wish their readers to receive from the first proposition, with what is so broadly and explicitly stated in the last. The opinion which the