it was notorious that many of the unfortunate individuals, thus traduced, were locked up in prifons, where calumny- and fufpicion were at that tyrannical period fufficient realons to confine and to treat them with the moft unfeeling barbarity. But were it only out of refpect for the rights of the people at large, a law fhould be abrogated, that took from them the conftitutional right of chufing to places and dignities in the ftate, thole whom they reputed worthy of their confidence. To deny them this right, was to abridge them of their liberties in a moft efential point. To plead the fafety of the nation was the language of tyranny, and would juftify every fpecies of defpotilm. What crimes had not been committed by the languinary tribunals, erected on the pretence of punithing the foes to the revolution? To these, and other arguments, in favour of a repeal, it was replied, by the fupporters of the law, that it paffed at a time when it was deemed indifpenfible for the prefervation of the national freedom, and the fecurity of the conftitution juft eftablished. Its numerous and active enemies were every where in motion, and striving with all their might to fet the people against it. Sufpicions were warrantable motives to exclude those on whom they fell, at a time when fo many were jufily fufpe@ed, from stations of power and truft, wherein they might have acted fo hoftile a part to the commonwealth. Would it have been prudent to expofe it to fuch danger at home, while menaced by fo many foes from abroad? Allowing that a number of individuals fuffered unjalily by this law, was not this a much lefs inconvenience than to VOL. XXXVIII. throw the whole nation at once into the hands of fo many concealed enemies? But the fullering, fo bitterly complained of, amounted only to a temporary fufpenfion of their rights, of which they would undergo the deprivation, no longer than the fhort space that might elapfe till the refloration of general tranquillity. As foon as peace was re-established, both at home and abroad, the fufpenfion of all privileges would ceafe, and every man be placed on the completeft footing of equality, in refpect of pretenfions to public employments. But till that period, it were the height of imprudence to place confidence in any but the tried friends to the commonwealth. The promotion of others would unavoidably excite fears and jealoufies. With what profpect of impartial juftice could the relations of emigrants be entrufted with the execution of the fevere, but neceflary, laws enacted against them? Inftances might occur, in the prefent fituation of things, when not only the liberty and property, but the very life of the deareft relative would be at flake: was it to be expected that the ties of confanguinity would not have their influence on thefe occafions, and that a man coolly and determinately would doom another to death, whofe life was as dear to him as his own? In this light, the law, fo violently reprobated, was in fact humane and merciful: it exempted individuals from thofe terrible conflicts between the feelings of nature, and the dictates of duty, wherein they could neither yield to the one nor to the other, without incuring the imputation of betraying their truft, or of wanting huma nity. When these various circum[ M ] frances ftances were duly confidered, it muft appear that the repeal of the law in queftion would be attended evidently with fo many inconveniences, that no judicious and unbiaffed perfon could require it. The intereft of the public was not, in truth, more concerned in maintaining that law in its full vigour, than that of private fan.ilies: both would equally fuffer from its abolition. It would often happen that juftice would not be done to the public, or that by doing it, men would embitter the remainder of their lives, and become objects either of general refentment or compaffion. It being clear, therefore, that much more evil than good, muft flow from the repeal of the law; and the fecurity of the ftate being, at the fame time, a motive that ought to fuperfede all others, that law could not with any propriety be abrogated. It was, at the fame time, much to be fufpected, that many of thofe, who recommended fuch a measure, acted from finifter motives, as nothing could be a ftronger proof of its impropriety, than the fatisfaction univerfally expreffed, by the royalifts, at fuch a queftion being brought before the two councils. A multiplicitly of other arguments were alleged by the contending parties, in which the public joined with an earneftnefs that thewed how much all men were convinced of the importance of the Subject in debate. But the report of the committee feemed to carry an influence that could not, and ought not to be refifted. This was the opinion of the people at large, even more than of the council of five hundred, as the queftion againft the repeal was carried by a majority of only forty-four. The minority, encouraged by this evidence of their strength, refolved, if it were not able to compass the repeal of the law of the third of Brumaire, (25th October, 1795;) fo to modify its provifions, as to direct them equally at the partifans and inftruments of the terrorifts and jacobins; and the royalifts, who, after taking up arms against the republic, had fubmitted and been pardoned. The propofal of fuch an amendment proved highly exafperating to the fupporters of that law, who afferted, that fufficient moderation had been fhewn in exempting from its opera tion the actors and abetters in the infurrection against the conventional decrees for the re-elections. But the general difpofition of the council was fo ftrongly marked by impartiality on this occafion, that the amendment was carried, to the great furprize of the public; the majority of which, though decidedly inclined to measures of lenity, was fearful of that preponderance of jacobinifm, which had hitherto exerted fo irrefiftable an influence over all the proceedings of the legiflature. The council of elders would willingly have confented to the total repeal of the law of the third Brumaire, and embraced, therefore, with readinefs, an opportunity of mitigating its feverity, by aflenting to the amendment made by the council of five hundred. This alteration of that fevere law proved a matter of unexpected triumph to the moderate party, which conftituted a large majority of the nation. The exclufion from pofts of emolument, or of power, was was a heavy blow on that fanguinary faction, which had ruled by terror. It loft thereby a multitude of its agents, whofe crimes now rendered them ineligible to public employments, and many were, on the fame account, obliged to vacate those which they poffeffed. The difcerning part of the public looked upon this event, as a fpecies of revolution, and formed the firongest hope that it would promote a reconciliation between the friends to a republican government, and thofe to a limited monarchy. Liberty being equally the aim of CHAP. XI. Effects expected in France from a growing Spirit of Moderation.-The Chief Object in the Councils of France, how to Break or to Weaken the Power of England.-Plan of the French for that End.-Means for Refloring the Pecuniary Credit of the French Republic.—A Rupture threatened between the French Councils and Executive Directory.—Prevented by the neceffity of their acting in Concert.-The Legislature Invade the Province of the Directory, by the Appointment of a Committee for judging in Cafes of Appeals from Emigrants.-Loftiness of the Directory.-Humbled by the Wife Economy and Firmness of the United States of America.-Jealoufies and Difputes between the French and Americans.—And an open Rupture. HE fpirit of lenity that feemed rifhed by the new conftitution, began to operate powerfully in its favour, and to gain it daily fresh adherents. The people in France appeared in general extremely willing to fupport it, hoping that the period of internal confufions would thereby be accelerated, and that the European powers leagued against them, when they found that unanimity was re-eftablifhed among the French, would ceafe to profecute the war for the restoration of the houfe of Bourbon to the throne of France, against the manifeft will of the nation. The heads of the republic were now deeply occupied in the concerting of means to counteract the meafures of that power, on the indefatigable efforts of which all the others depended for the fupport of their own. It was with unfeigned mortification that France beheld that power unfhaken and undimi that had befallen the other parts of the coalition. That invincible fpirit, which had fo many ages accompanied the councils and the arms of England, and enabled it to maintain fo many contests with France, had, in the prefent, difplayed greater energy than ever, and imprefled feveral of the foundeft politicians with an idea, that however the French republic might for a while diffufe the terror of its arms among the neighbouring ftates, the perfevering courage of the English, aided by their immenfe opulence, would finally weary out the endeavours of the French to retain the acquifitions they had made; and, that notwithstanding the republic itfelf might remain, it would, on the iffue of the terrible trial it had ftood, be compelled to remit of the pretenfions it had formed to prefcribe terms of peace to all its numerous enemies, and to treat treat at last upon a footing of equality with that one, which, while it remained unvanquished, would always prove an effectual obftacle to that plan of universal influence over. all the governments of Europe, which France had, fince the unexpected fuccefs of its arms, kept confiantly in view. French, is inconteftible, from the various publications of the time, and no lefs from that remarkable anxiety with which their rulers canvaffed every fubject relating to England. How to compafs its depreffion was the chief object of their councils; and every fortunate event that befel them, in their numerous enterprizes, employed their confideration in what manner to convert it to the detriment of England. However the French might exult in the triumphant career of their armies, it plainly appeared, by the fentiments repeatedly expreffed by the principal fpeakers of the convention, and in the councils, and upon all public occafions, to be their intimate perfuafion, however averse to avow it, that while England flood its ground, they would never totally accomplish thofe mighty fchemes of conqueft and influence. To execute them partially, would only involve them in perpetual quarrels with thofe powers whofe intereft required their depreffion, and whofe caufe England would never fail to fupport. Thus it was clear, that unless the ftrength of this ancient rival were effectually broken, and it were reduced to fue for peace on fuch terms as France thould dictate, the propofed effect of fo many victories would be fruftrated, as the humiliation of all its other enemies would not fecure to the republic thofe objects at which it avowedly The prolongation of the war, in order to attain thefe, might be attended with fuch viciffitudes of fortune, as would entirely change the circumftances of affairs, and oblige the republic, in its turn, to abate of its high pretenfions, and even to compound for its existence, and the prefervation of the ancient limits of France That these ideas frequently occurred to the moft fagacious of the Among the various means of obtaining that important end, the annoyance of the English maritime commerce, had long been tried, certainly not without fome degree of fuccefs: but in no degree fufficient to weaken the naval power of England, which continued to rule the feas in every quarter of the globe, with irrefiftible fway. It was indeed from this very circumftance, that France derived a multiplicity of arguments in its manifeftos and exhortations, both to its own people, and to the other nations of Europe. Their tendency was to prove, that England was the tyrant of the sea, and that all the European powers were interested in repreffing that tyranny. To effect this, they ought to unite cordially with France, and fecond its endeavours to restore the freedom of the feas, by abridging, through every means in their power, the commercial refources of England. The actual ftrength of its navy was fo great, that it could not at prefent be oppofed with much hope of fuccefs: but other methods might be ufed not less effectual in their ultimate iffue, and these were in the option of every state. That the power which commanded the feas, commanded alfo the fhores, and that naval power was of more importance than dominion at land, [M3] had |