temporary fplendour, ultimately fide of the Rhine, into which they wrought their ruin, and introduced a new order of affairs into the diftracted and fluctuating common wealth. The close of the year 1795 was pot so favourable to the French as that of the preceding; they had projected at its commencement to follow up their fuccesses in Holland, by carrying their victorious arms into the heart of Germany; but a variety of obstructions had either prevented or fruftrated their designs. At home the violence of the many factions, open or concealed, stood perpetually in the way of government, and impaired its proposed energies. Abroad the remaining parts of the coalition against France, though foiled in their repeated attempts, ftill preserved their spirit, and determination to perfist at ail hazards in carrying on the war. The principal scene of action had been on the banks of the Rhine. Here it had been generally expected, that after the fubjugation of the seven United Provinces, the French would have met with no confiderable oppofition; but though difpirited, as well as weakened, by the fevering of fo material a limb from the great body of the confederacy, it still found fufficient refources to make head against the French, in a country where the geperality of the inhabitants, though dudatisfied at their rulers, were not to imprudent as to prefer a foreign to a domeftic yoke, and would not lail to co-operate in oppofing a French invation. To this disposition of an incomparable majority of the inhabitants of Germany was, in a great meafure, due the little progrefs of the French in those provinces of the empire on the right had, with much difficulty, found means to penetrate, and from which they had been, after much fruitless toil and unfuccefsful efforts, compelled to retire with very confider able loffes. The failure of the French in their expedition into Germany; their expulfion from every poft they had occupied on the eastern banks of the Rhine; their retreat across that river; the pursuit of their discomfited army into the borders of France; and the several defeats they experienced, were circumstances fo little hoped for at the commencement of this year's military operations in those parts that they proportionably revived the spirit of their enemies, and infused a degree of confidence into them, to which they had been strangers, fince the disasters of the preceding campaign. But, notwithstanding their ill fuccess on the Rhine, the French maintained a decided fuperiority in every other quarter. Europe feemed to stand at bay, and to wait with anxiety the terinination of a quarrel that had produced fo many ftupendous events. The diffolution of the confederacy, by the feceffion of Pruffia and Spain, was far from being confidered as complete: the principal members, Great Britain and Auftria were held fully competent, though not to the purpose of fubduing, yet still to that of repreffing the French; and this was now viewed as the only object, at which they ought, in prudence, in the prefent fituation of their affairs, to aim. During the course of the campaign, the government in France håd entertained fome ideas tending to a general pacification; but the [B2] loftiloftiness of their pretenfions, dictated by the pride of their nation, was fo apparent, that Europe was not furprised that they were only mentioned tranfiently in their occafional difcourses on that fubject. The inveteracy of the ruling party to England fubfifted almost as violently as ever. The French beheld, with that rancour which attends an unfuccefsful rivalship, the improbability of their ever attaining to an equality with the English at fea. It greatly.mortified their pride, that all the European nations should unanimoufly afcribe a decided superiority in naval tactics to the English, and represent those as no less invincible on the ocean, than the French had hitherto been at land; with this difference, however, to the difadvantage of the latter, that it would prove a much easier task to overcome them at land than the others at fea. Other caufes of dissatisfaction militated against the ruling party in France. The royalifts, however depressed, were not difpirited: their numbers, though inferior to those of the republicans, were immenfse; they maintained a close correfpondence with each other, and cemented their reciprocal connections with all those acts of friendship and kindnefs that bind men so strongly together, when fuffering from the same caufes, and acting from the fame motives. The vigilance of the republican government found conftant employment in obviating the dangers that threatened it from the indefatigable activity of those irreconcilable antagonifts, who, though furrounded with continual observers of all their motions, neglected no opportunity 8 to further their designs, and boldly encountered every risk of being detected in their prosecution. Enraged at these domestic enemies, the predominant party was perpetually occupied in holding out every species of menace and terror to reprefs and discourage them; but neither threats nor invitations availed. Actuated by hatred and resentment the royalists confidered themselves as equally justified, by confcience and interest, in their determination to seize every occafion of refifting the established powers, holding them as ufurpers, with whom no measures ought to be kept, and whom they were bound to oppofe, whenever there appeared the leaft likelihood of doing it to any effect. Such was the fituation of France at this period, deeply convulfed at home, and though in poffeffion of many extensive countries, yet, fearful that having acquired, and retaining them only by the right of the sword, they might lose them through the fame means: an event, which, confidering the viciffitudes of war, was not more improbable than the aftonishing successes that had attended their arms against all likelihood and expectation. While the people in France were distracted with these internal divifions, those of England were agitated little less with inceffant differences and disputes on the propriety of continuing a war, which had occafioned such losses of men and expence of treafure, without producing those effects which had fo repeatedly been represented as infallible. Nothing had been omitted to procure fuccess: every ministerial demand had been granted, every measure acceeded to; but the object proposed remained unaccomplished, and as far out of the reach of all reasonable expectation, as at the first moment of its being attempted All parties seemed, at this period, to unite in the like strain of reasoning. Numbers of those who had warmly espoufed the cause of the minifter, thought that a fufficient trial had been made of the various schemes he had brought forward, in order to compel the French to revert to their former situation; and that, having failed, prudence enjoined him to defift, and to leave the re-eftablishment of the French monarchy to a future period, and more aufpicious opportunities. remained That party, which had opposed the war from its very commencement, were loud in their reprobation of its continuance, and reproached minifters with a total want of forefight, in not ferming to have apprehended the difficulties they would have to contend with, and, with equal inability, to encounter thee. As the events of the war countenanced these reproaches, the public joined in them, and the government was thought very reprehentible in perfifting against reiterated experience, in a conteft that threatened to waste the strength of the nation ineffectually, and the aim of which, were it attained, would not prove an indemnification for its coft. Ideas of this nature were now generally predominant, and became, at last, so prevalent, not only among the multitude, which had long been fwayed by them, but among the more reputable ciaffes, that a variety of affociations were formed, and meetings held, for the avowed purpole of petitioning the legiflature in lavour of peace. The city of Lon don led the way, and, in a commonhall, the votes, for a petition, were four thousand, and only one hundred against it. The terms in which it was conceived were extremely pointed. "None of the ends proposed by the war, (to use the words of the petition) had either been, or appeared likely to be, obtained, although it had been carried on at an unprecedented expence to this country, and had already produced an alarming increase of the national debt, augmented by fubfidies, paid to allies, who had notorioufly violated their folemn engagements, and rendered no adequate fervice for large fums actually received by them, and wrung from the credulity of the generous and induftrions inhabitants of this ifland." It concluded by expressing a firm and decided conviction, that the principle on which the war appeared to be carried on, neither was, nor could be, essential to the liberty, the glory, or the profperity, of the British empire. Other addresses, in a fimilar style, were refolved on in feveral of the principal cities in the kingdom. The adherents to miniftry endeavoured, on the other hand, to procure counter petitions: bat thefe were faint and languid in comparifon to the former; those who framed them, did not venture to fpeak in juftification of the war; they went no farther than to leave to minifters the choice of their own time for pacific negociations. A circumstance that had greatly indisposed the mercantile and trad ing claffes against miniftry, was, the refusal to permit the Dutch people of property, to depofit facir money and effects in England, without pay[B3] ing ing the customary duties. Had this permiffion been granted, upwards of twenty millions of fpecie, and other treafure, would, it was faid, have been brought into this country. The reason alleged, for denying the request of the Dutch mer chants, was, that if they were al lowed to transport their effects into England, it would operate as a difcouragement to their countrymen, and prevent them from acting with vigour against the French, who, having fubdued the Austrian Netherlands, were then preparing to carry their victorious arms into the United Provinces: but the reply to this allegation was, that the French party was so powerful in Holland, that it was easy to foresee that all resistance would be vain. It would have been good policy, therefore, to have encouraged the moniedmen, in that country, to have lodged their property in England; as most of them were manifeftly inclined to do, in order to preserve it from the rapacity of the French, whose wants were fuch as would infallibly induce them to fupercede all confiderations, in order to provide for them as foon as they should find themselves in pofleffion of a country, the wealth of which was competent to fupply them with what they needed. This refufal, on the part of the British administration, was generally deemed a very unseasonable overfight. It threw into the hands of the French an immenfe quantity of money and wealth of every denomination, which might evidently have centered in England, together with its owners. This would, in a very confiderable meafure, have compenfated for the lofs of Holland to the confederacy, and amply indemnified Great Britain, by the prodigi ous acceffion of real property that must have been the neceffary consequence of the emigrations of rich individuals from the United Provinces. Another overfight, no less real, though less noticed, was an article in a treaty which had been agreed on with the American States, by which their trade to the British islands in the West Indies was restricted to vessels of an inferior fize. This, instead of diminishing their commerce thither, tended rather to encrease it, by adding to their number of seamen: whether in large, or in small vessels, this commerce was so profitable to them, that whatever obstacles were thrown in their way, would quickly be overcome by their industry and activity: the profits of trade would be more divided, but the number of hands employed in it would produce the double confequence, both of gradually extending it, and of augmenting the number of American seamen. These various confiderations contributed materially to difplease the generality of people. The burthens of the war were so heavy, and fuch multitudes felt their weight, that discontents and murmurs abounded every where. The different motives afsigned, at different epochs of the war, for its continuance, were also highly prejudicial to ministers, as they led many to think that the real motive was purposedly kept out of fight, and was of too invidious a nature to be frankly acknowledged. Ideas of this nature were now universally current among the difapprovers of the war, and were afferted and circulated by them with confiderable effect. But that circumstance which was the most un fortunate fortunate and alarming, in the midst of this general dillatisfaction, was, that it had arifen, in many, to such a degree of rancour at the authors and abettors of the war, that the attachment, which men naturally feel for their country, and its concerns, had given way to fentiments of the most violent hatred and hoftility to government. It was no longer a fimple disapprobation of the war; it was a fervent defire that it might terminate to the difadvantage of this country, and that the French might prevail against the English. So extraordinary and unnatural an antipathy arose, however, from other causes besides the war with France: the perfuafion that no reforms would take place in the government, while it was able to maintain its ground against France, prompted the determined advocates of these reforms, to express, with marked anxiety, their wishes for the fuccefs of this inveterate enemy to England. They seemed unconscious, or heedless, of the consequences that must neceffarily follow, were the French to fucceed in their defigns against this country, to that extent which they had projected, and which the generality of their well-wishers in England appeared to defire with no less fervour than themselves. But the animofities, produced by internal divifions, had, in truth, taken fuch unhappy poslession of most men, that those who fought to reconcile them to moderation, became equally odious to both parties: no medium was allowed; whoever deplored the war, as pregnant with calamities that might have been avoided, was reputed a foe to his country; whoever pronounced it just, and neceffary, was deemed a confpirator against its liberty, and an abettor of arbitrary power. In this unfortunate disposition of mind the nation continued during the whole year 1795. The fummer, in particular, was marked by a variety of tumults and riots. These were occafioned by the methods practifed in the enlisting of men for the army: what with the general averseness of the common people to the war; what with the iniquity of the practice itself, those who were concerned in it became such objects of execration to the multitude, that their perfons and dwellings were equally exposed to its resentment and fury. Several houses, either tenanted, or made use of, by those who are vulgarly known by the appellation of crimps, were demolished, or stripped of their furniture, and the owners put in danger of their lives. So great was the rage of the populace, that it was not without some difficulty those riots were fuppreffed by the foldiery. Several of those who had been active in these disturbances were executed; but the public highly disapproved the condemnation, to death, of individuals, guilty of no other offence than giving way to a sudden impulfe of indignation at the violence offered to their fellow fubjects. Such was the temper of the commonalty, previous to the meeting of parliament, about the close of October, 1795. A fermentation of the most alarming kind seemed to pervade the whole mass of the people. The various associations of individuals, united for the purpose of obtaining a parliamentary reform, were, at this period, peculiarly noticed for their boldness and activity. That which was known by the name of the corresponding fo[B4] ciety, |