However combinations or affociations of the above defeription inay, now and then, answer popular ends, they are likely, in the courfe of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to fubvert the power of the people, and to ufurp for themselves the reins of government; deftroying afterwards the very enemies which have lifted them to unjuft dominion. Towards the prefervation of your government, and the permanency of your prefent happy ftate, it is requifite, not only that you teadily discountenance irregular oppofitions to its acknowledged authority, but alfo, that you refitt with care the fpirit of innovation upon its principles, however fpecious the pretexts. One method of affault may be to effect, in the forms of the conflitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the fyftem, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at leaft as neceffary to fix the true character of governments as of other human intitutions-that experience is the fureft ftandard by which to teft the real tendency of the exifting conftitution of a country that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothefis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothefis and opinion; and remember, efpecially, that for the efficient management of your common interefts, in a country fo extensive as our's, a government of as much vigour as is confiftent with the perfect fecurity of liberty is indifpenfable. Liberty itself will find in fuch a go vernment, with powers properly diftributed and adjusted, its furett guardian. It is, indeed, little elfe than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprizes of faction, to confine each member of the fociety within the limits prefcribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of perfons and property. I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with the particular reference to the founding of them on geogra phical difcriminations. Let me now take a more comprehenfive view, and warn you in the most folemn manner against the baneful effects of the fpirit of party generally. This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, baving its roots in the ftrongeft paffions of the human mind. It exists under different thapes in all governments, more or lefs ftifled, controuled, or oppreffed; but in those of the popular form it is feen in its greatest rankness, and it is truly their worst enemy. The alternate dominion of one faction over another, fharpened by the fpirit of revenge natural to party diffention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the moft horrid enormities, is itfelf a moft horrid defpotifm. But this leads at length to a more formal and permament defpotifm. The diforders and miferies which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repose in the abfolute power of an individual; and, fooner or later, the chief of fome prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own ele vation, vation, on the ruins of public liberty. Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continued mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wife people to difcourage and reftrain it. It ferves always to diftract the public councils and enfeeble the public adminiftration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption which find a facilitated accefs to the government itself through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another. There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and ferve to keep alive the fpirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical caft, patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour, upon the fpirit of party. Bat in thofe of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every falutary purpofe. And there being conftant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and aifuage it. A fire not to be quenched: it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, inftead of warming, it fhould confume. It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country thould infpire caution in thofe entrusted with its adminiftration, to confine themfelves within their respective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercife of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft estimate of that love of power, and pronenefs to abufe it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceflity of reciprocal checks in the exercife of political power, by dividing and diftributing it into different depofitories, and conftituting each the guardian of the public weal against invafions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; fome of them in our country, and under our own eyes. To preferve them must be as neceffary as to inftitute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the diftribution or modification of the conftitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the conftitution defignates. But let there be no change by ufurpation; for though this, in one inftance, may be the inftrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are deftroyed. The precedent must always greatly over-balance in permanent evil any partial or tranfient benefit which the ufe can at any time yield. Of Of all the difpofitions and habits which lead to political profperity, religion and morality are indifpenfable supports. In vain would that man clain the tribute of patriotifm who fhould labour to fubvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmeft props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to refpect 'and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connection with private and public felicity. Let it fimply be atked, where is the fecurity for property, for reputation, for life, if the fenfe of jeligious obligation defert the oaths, which are the inftruments of investigation in courts of juftice? And let us with caution indulge the fuppofition that morality can be maintained without religion. What every may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar ftructure, reafon and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclufion of religious principle. It is fubftantially true, that virtue or morality is a neceflary fpring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or lefs force to every fpecies of free government. Who that is a fincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to fhake the foundation of the fabric? Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, inftitutions for the general diffution of knowledge. In proportion as the fructure of government gives force to public opinion, it is effential that public opinion fhould be enlightened. As a very important fource of ftrength and fecurity, cherith pub. lis credit. One method of prefer ving it is to ufe as fparingly as poffible; avoiding occafions of expence by cultivating peace, but remembering alfo that timely dif bursements to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater difburfements to repel it; avoiding likewife the accumulation of debt, not only by fhunning occasions of expence, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to difcharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occafioned, not ungenerously throwing upon pofterity the burthen which we ourfelves ought to bear. The execution of thefe maxims belong to your reprefentatives, but it is neceffary that public opinion fhould co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is effential that you thould practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be a revenue: that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or lefs inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinfic embarrafliment infeparable from the felection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decifive motive for a candid conftruction of the conduct of the government in making it,and for a fpirit of acquiefcence in the measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate. Obferve good faith and juftice towards all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct: and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no great diftant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by en exalted juftice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the courfe of time and things the fruits of fuch a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages, which might be loft by a fteady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtues? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every fentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impoflible by its vices? In the execution of fuch a plan, nothing is more effential than that the permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and paffionate attachments for others, thould be excluded; and that in place of them, juft and amicable feelings towards all fhould be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondnefs, is in fome degree a flave. It is a flave to its animofity or to its affection, either of which is fufficient to lead it aftray from its duty and its intereft. Antipathy in one nation against another difpofes each more readily to offer infult and injury, to lay hold of flight caufes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occafions of difpute occur. Hence frequent collifions, obftinate, envenomed, and bloody contefts. The nation, prompted by ill-will and refentment, fometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the beft calculations of policy. The government fometimes participates in the national propenfity, and adopts, through paffion, what reafon would reject; at other times it makes the animofity of the na tion fubfervient to projects of hoftility, inftigated by pride, ambition, and other finifter and pernicious motives. The peace often, fometimes, perhaps, the liberty of nations, has been the victim." So, likewife, a paffionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favourite nation, facil tating the infufion of an imaginary common intereft, in cafes where no real common intereft exifts, and infufing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or juftification. It leads alfo to concellious to the favourite nation, of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the conceflions; by unneceffarily parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting jealoufy, ill-will, and a difpofition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote themselves to the favourite nation) facility to betray, or facrifice the interefts of their own country, without odium, fometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous fenfe of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the bafe or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. As the avenues to foreign influence are in innumerable ways, fuch attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domeftic factions, to practife the arts of feduction, to miflead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils? Such an attachment of a fmall or weak, towards a great or powerful nation, dooms the former to be fatellite of the latter. Against the infidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be conftantly awake; fince hiftory and experience prove, that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of a republican government. But that jealousy to be ufeful must be impartial; elfe it becomes the inftrument of the very influence to be avoided, inftead of a defence against it. Exceffive partiality for one foreign nation, and exceffive diflike of another, cause those whom they actuate to fee danger only on one fide, and ferve to veil and even fecond the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may refift the intrigues of the favourites, are liable to become fufpected and odious; while its tools and dupes ufurp the applaufe and confidence of the people, to furrender their interefts. The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as poffible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.-Here let us ftop. Europe has a fet of primary interefts, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence the must be engaged in frequent controverfies, the caufes of which are effentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwife in us to implicate ourfelves by artificial ties in the ordinary viciflitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collifions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and diftant fituation invites and enables us to pursue a different courfe. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take fuch an attitude as will caufe the neutrality we may at any time refolve upon to be fcrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impoflibility of making acquifitions upon us, will not lightly bazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our intereft, guided by justice, fhal! counfel. Why forego the advantages of fo peculiar a fituation? Why quit our own to ftand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and profperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalfhip, intereft, humour, or caprice? 'Tis our true policy to fleer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world; fo far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me be not underftood as capable of patronifing infidelity to exifting engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public, than to private affairs, that honefty is always the beft policy. I repeat it, therefore, let thofe engagements be obferved, in their genuine fenfe. |