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The English Government has sufficient reason to consider the French in North America, as the best guardians of the submission of their colonies.


The cabinet of Versailles was compelled by good policy, to regard the supremacy of England over Canada, as a valuable source of inquietude and jealousy to the Americans. The neighborhood of a formidable enemy, necessarily enhanced the value which they attached to the friendship and support of the French monarch. L. DI SEVELINGUES.

The French court, though mortified by the loss of Canada, was by no means insensible of the disadvantageous position in which Britain was placed, relatively to her own colonies, by the acquisition of it. In the commencement of their revolutionary struggle, the Americans besought the aid of France, not only to free them from the yoke of Britain, but to enable them to conquer Canada, Nova Scotia, and Florida. JAMES GRAHAME.


The Emancipation of Canada, is an object which Congress have much at heart.



It is a measure much to be wished; and, I believe, would not be displeasing to the body of the peo


While Carleton remains among them, with three or four thousand troops, they dare not avow their sentiments, if really they are favorable, without a strong support.


If that country is not with us ;-from its proximity to the Eastern States, its intercourse and connection with the numerous tribes of western Indians, its communication with them by water, and other local advantages, it will be at least a troublesome, if not a dangerous, neighbor to us; and ought, at all events, to be in the same interest and politics as the other States.


The question of the Canadian expedition, in the form in which it now stands, appears to me one of the most interesting that has hitherto agitated our national deliberations.


I have one objection to it, which is, in my estimation, insurmountable, and alarms all my feelings for

*The Governor of Quebec.

the true and permanent interests of my country. This is, the introduction of a large body of French troops into Canada, and putting them in possession of the capital of that province, attached to them by all the ties of blood, habits, manners, religion, and former connection of government. I fear, this would be too great a temptation to be resisted, by any power actuated by the common maxims of national policy.



Let us realize, for a moment, the striking advantages France would derive from the possession of Canada; the acquisition of an extensive territory, abounding in supplies, for the use of her islands; the opening a vast source of the most beneficial commerce with the Indian nations, which she might then monopolize; the having ports of her own, on this continent, independent of the precarious good-will of an ally; the engrossing of the whole trade of Newfoundland, whenever she pleased, the finest nursery of seamen in the world; the security afforded to her islands; and, finally, the facility of awing and controlling these States, the natural and most formidable rival of every maritime power in Europe.

Canada would be a solid acquisition to France, on all these accounts, and because of the numerous inhabitants, subjects to her by inclination, who would

aid in preserving it under her power, against the attempts of every other.


France, acknowledged, for some time past, the most powerful monarchy in Europe, by land; able now to dispute the empire of the sea with Great Britain, and, if joined by Spain, I may say, certainly superior; possessed of New Orleans on our right, Canada on our left; and seconded by the numerous tribes of Indians in our rear, from one extremity to the other, a people so generally friendly to her, and whom she knows so well how to conciliate, would, it is much to be apprehended, have it in her power, to give law to these States.


Suppose, that, when the five thousand French troops, (and, under the idea of that number, twice as many might be introduced,) had entered the city of Quebec, they should declare an intention to hold Canada, as a pledge and surety for the debts due to France from the United States, or, under other specious pretences, hold the place till they can find a bone of contention, and, in the mean while, should excite the Canadians to engage in supporting their

pretences and claims, what should we be able to say, with only four or five thousand men to carry on the dispute? It may be supposed, that France would not choose to renounce our friendship, by a step of this kind, as the consequence would be reunion with England, on some terms or other, and the loss of what she had acquired in so violent and unjustifiable a manner, with all the advantages of an alliance with us. This, in my opinion, is too slender a security against the measure, to be relied on.


If France and Spain should unite, and obtain a decided superiority by sea, a reunion with England would avail us very little, and might be set at defiance.

France, with a numerous army at command, might throw in what number of land forces she thought proper, to support her pretensions. And England, without men, without money, and inferior on her favorite element, could give no effectual aid to oppose them. Resentment, Reproaches, and Submission, seem to be all that would be left to us.

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